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REVISITING DIGITAL MUSICAL SAMPLING CASES THROUGH A 
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALIST PERSPECTIVE WITH A PARTICULAR 
FOCUS ON GRAND UPRIGHT MUSIC LIMITED V. WARNER BROTHERS 
RECORDS, INC. 
 
DANIEL JOHN CARROLL 
 
ABSTRACT 
Digital sampling, wherein excerpts from pre-existing recordings are incorporated into a 
new recording, has been a vibrant and innovative manner of artistic creation since the 
1960s. However, this practice has engendered complex infringement litigation, blurring 
the commonly understood lines that separate the musical “composition” from the 
“recording.” The has been exacerbated by conflicting articulations as to the status of 
these entities as “works” within musicological discourse and conceptions of copyright 
law such that they would warrant protection from infringement. Furthermore, sampling 
has complicated the application of previously utilized principles of copyright law, such as 
de minimis and substantial similarity, and has not occasioned much, if any, consideration 
in litigation as to the artistic or creative purposes for which samples were used. 
 
This thesis considers Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Records, 
Inc., the first notable case involving digital sampling. The first two chapters offer an 
historical overview of the development of American copyright law and its musical 
purview, and proceeds to the facts and ultimate judicial ruling in this case. Through the 
interpretive lens of “democratic experimentalism,” the remainder of the thesis proposes 
 v 
an alternative method for handling digital sampling cases than that of the Grand Upright 
court and other courts in subsequent cases. This is offered with a view to taking a more 
comprehensive account of the materially quantitative and artistically qualitative aspects 
of particular acts of sampling.   
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PREFACE 
Philosophical considerations on music in their various operations, whether aesthetic, 
metaphysical, phenomenological, or ontological, frequently and extensively focus upon 
the concept of the “musical work.” Similar to the attempt to proffer a uniformly 
applicable and unanimously acceptable definition of “artworks,” generally construed, 
given their inherently nebulous, or, as one writer has put it, “deviant” ontology, the 
immense difficulty in satisfactorily defining the “work” of music is evident in both 
theoretical and practical parameters.
1
 The aim of determining what a “musical work” is, 
or what its defining features are, is a matter that has occupied the attention of 
philosophers, musicians, musicologists, and theorists of the arts to an insatiable degree 
given the potential impossibility of ever concocting a singularly agreeable and 
authoritative definition of the concept. This difficulty has led some, even if anecdotally, 
to nonetheless question the general utility of such an enterprise while insisting that our 
very intellectual nature as being immersed in a perpetual musical soundscape compels the 
continuation of this inquiry.
2
 
But the very need to continue an attempt to define the “musical work,” to say 
nothing of the nearly insurmountable quantity of literature already available in which 
those attempts are presented, underlines how susceptible the concept is to multiple 
definitions or understanding as to its nature and existence. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the entry on “Ontology” for the Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music 
                                                          
1
 Joseph Margolis, “The Deviant Ontology of Artworks,” in Theories of Art Today, edited by 
Noël Carroll, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2000): 109.  
2
 Ken Okubo, “On the Musical Work Game: An Essay on the Concept of the Musical Work,” 
International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music 32 (June 2001): 66. 
 vii 
opens with a litany of questions that must be jointly and severally considered in order to 
adequately deal with the larger issue: “Are there musical works? If there are musical 
works, what are they like? […] What ontological category or categories do musical works 
belong to? Where are musical works located in time? How are musical works 
individuated?”3 While this might seem to be a purely theoretical matter confined solely to 
academic contexts without a significant possibility for being applied to “real-world” 
situations, it does have some significant implications in terms of its practical application 
to the area of musical copyright law, which is the general subject on which this thesis 
focuses, and its relevance for the propriety, practice, legality/illegality, and regulation of 
digital sampling, upon which this thesis more specifically focuses.  
A tentative and by no means exhaustive series of questions regarding the identity 
of the “musical work” in terms of copyright law and digital sampling, which is defined as 
“process in which a sound is taken directly from a recorded medium and transposed into 
a new recording”4 and is, in this thesis, referred to in the context of hip-hop composition 
and recording, can be distilled as follows: which particular elements of a musical 
composition can be protected by copyright? Does the recording of a composition qualify 
as a “work” in the same manner as the composition it contains? If so, what implications 
for copyright law does this phenomenon have? Are we to impose the same qualitative and 
                                                          
3
 Carl Matheson and Ben Caplan, “Ontology,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and 
Music, edited by Andrew Kania and Theodore Gracyk, (Florence, Kentucky: Routledge, 2011): 
38. 
4
 Will Fulford-Jones, “Sampling,” in The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, edited 
by Stanley Sadie (London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 2001), 219. 
 viii 
quantitative restrictions on sampling from recordings of compositions as we are on the 
compositions themselves?  
These questions, and many others that occupy the purview of both the philosophy 
of music and the copyright law surrounding it, will be addressed throughout this thesis 
with particular attention devoted to how they are implicated in Grand Upright Music 
Limited v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.,
5
 the first major case to confront the practice of 
digital sampling from a legal perspective.  
The facts and procedural history of this case are presented in Chapter Three. For 
now, it would suffice to state that the decision of the Court in this case, which essentially 
criminalized digital sampling—at least without the appropriate licensing—has been 
roundly criticized for its hasty and inadequately substantiated conclusions. The blanket 
condemnation of the practice of digital sampling, which presumably would have been 
tempered considerably if the Court had engaged in the “empirical” tests set forth in prior 
case law with respect to the particular circumstances of Grand Upright, might reasonably 
be attributed to the novelty of the sampling practice in itself and to its manifest novelty in 
being entertained in the context of musical copyright litigation. This would be because 
the multitude of its predecessors dealt with borrowing of musical material from 
compositions as written and not as recorded—a distinction which will be addressed 
throughout this thesis. But it also can be attributed to an insufficient consideration of the 
various artistic purposes for which the sampling could have been performed and that may 
                                                          
5
 Grand Upright Music Limited v Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 780 F. Supp 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) 
 ix 
have rendered it “fair use” or otherwise permissible under copyright law. Finally, other 
than the expectation that the appropriate license be acquired in order to legally sample, 
which was essentially the sole issue considered by the Court and which led to its finding 
of the illegality of the practice,
6
 the decision is made further unfortunate by the lack of 
any “objective” standards in the previous statutory or case law that could have guided the 
Court’s determination as to whether the sampling done in that case transgressed various 
legal boundaries.  
 As I shall argue, the inherently ambiguous and nebulous nature of making such 
determinations requires a more comprehensive consideration of various aspects of the 
sampling process undertaken in a particular case, such as the quantity and significance of 
the material used, the artistic purposes for which the sampling was done, the degree to 
which the original material is transformed, and other factors. In so doing, I 
retrospectively apply these principles to Grand Upright in order to demonstrate how the 
case might have been more adequately and thoughtfully decided, providing in turn an 
overall interpretive platform for contemporary musical infringement litigation. As 
philosophical, musicological, and legal considerations of the practice of digital sampling 
is a manifestly interdisciplinary enterprise, I base my proposition of this more 
comprehensive strategy on a perspective known as “democratic experimentalism,” which 
is defined as the ability to “either…act in conformity to a rule, or to provide a compelling 
account (as gauged by the experience of peers in similar situations) of why it is 
reasonable to deviate from the prescribed practice locally and perhaps more generally” 
                                                          
6
 This is one of several reasons for why it has been so sharply criticized. 
 x 
in the course of deliberations on particular legal matters.
7
  For my purposes, it is this 
perspective through which my interdisciplinary focus is directed, insofar as I am 
proposing a new and better method of evaluating instances of musical copyright 
infringement especially through digital sampling where an “objective,” uniformly 
required method does not currently exist. 
 Chapter One presents a chronological overview of the development of copyright 
law in the United States, including how, when, and for what reasons it expanded to 
accommodate works of the visual arts as well as musical compositions and recordings. 
Additionally, the chapter discusses how copyright law developed to accommodate 
various technological developments in the processes of recording and distributing 
musical compositions as the twentieth-century progressed.  
 Chapter Two presents a brief history of the practice of digital sampling, including 
the various technological mechanisms used to execute it, as well as various political, 
philosophical, ethical, and legal issues that the practice engenders. In addition, some of 
the legal challenges to musical borrowing before the advent of digital sampling are 
presented, indicating the relative conceptual and practical ease with which such matter 
were resolved, and after the practice became widespread with all the complications 
attendant to the distinction between compositions and the recordings that contain them. 
 Chapter Three presents the major facts and procedural history of Grand Upright, 
the ultimate decision, and some preliminary critique from a musicological and legal 
perspective pertaining to the hasty and short-sighted nature of the decision. Some 
                                                          
7
 Emphasis added. Charles Sabel, “Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism,” 
Contemporary Pragmatism 9 (December, 2012): 37. 
 xi 
attention is paid to the role of musicologists in the process of determining musical 
infringement, given their unique expertise on various kinds of musical borrowing, 
whether in a digital context or otherwise. 
 Chapter Four provides additional critique of the Court’s decision through the 
perspective of previously established and validated tests set forth for determining musical 
infringement which the Court did not consider. One of these tests entails considering the 
various artistic purposes for which the sampler in this case could have performed the 
sampling, and, to this end, a variety of purposes for sampling are considered in terms of 
potential reflection in the techniques of the sampler in Grand Upright. The chapter 
concludes by proposing a set of results that might have emerged had the Court employed 
a more comprehensive approach to this case and considered the various factors 
previously mentioned. 
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 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF MUSICAL 
COMPOSITIONS AND SOUND RECORDINGS 
 
This chapter will present a brief history of copyright legislation in the United States, 
including its legal and philosophical foundations, and also its expansion to accommodate 
musical works in both their written and recorded manifestations. It will be summarily 
explained how figures in the artistic, legislative, and legal fields have engaged in the 
application of copyright law to both of these entities, and how this application was 
adapted to the developments of technological media for musical creation. 
The most notable precursor to early American copyright legislation is the Statute 
of Anne, passed by the British Parliament in 1710. Prior to its passage, British book 
publishers had submitted to Parliament a bill on February 26, 1706, which would have 
granted property rights to authors in connection with their own literary works and 
indirectly encouraged them to produce new materials that were publicly accessible. This 
legislation was offered in the hopes of securing not only these rights for authors, but with 
the goal of creating a “public domain” so these materials would be more easily available. 
Alina Ng explains the circumstances and the underlying motivating philosophical and 
conceptual factors behind the passage of this legislation in ample detail. 
In terms of its social utility, the most important thing about the Statute of Anne 
was that it transformed the stationer’s copyright from a monopoly into a limited 
right that was designed to promote learning by making books and literary 
  
 
 
 
2 
materials more accessible even as it recognised the publisher’s right to be paid. It 
also created the public domain as the repository for creative materials to be 
available to society after the expiration of the copyright, serving the public 
interest by allowing users greater access to materials that allow the development 
of learning, education, and advances in knowledge. The historical circumstances 
leading up to the passing of the Statute indicate that Parliament intended to build a 
normative social order that would make literary and artistic works more available 
to everyone by transforming the stationer’s copyright, originally a device for 
censorship and an instrument to maintain the stationer’s monopoly, into a right 
that would honour an entitlement to be justly rewarded for making works 
available to society.
1
  
Ng also discusses some of the litigation that occurred subsequent to the passage of 
the Statute of Anne, and explains how rulings from various courts that were favorable to 
authors “were based on the notion that persons have natural rights in that which they 
create, and by extension, authors have natural rights in their literary works. Thus…if the 
author had copyright in his work before publication, he should have copyright in his work 
after publication.”2 The notion of an inherent property right held by a creator of an artistic 
or literary work in the very product itself is a theme that would appear in deliberations 
over various measures of copyright legislation that were advanced in the early years of 
the United States. This idea was significant for the development of the modern notion of 
“intellectual property,” as explained by Martin Kretschmer. 
The modern history of intellectual property start[ed] with the Renaissance when 
several factors combined to turn copyright into a politico-legal issue. The first 
factor was the emergence of a sense of individualism (first realized in the art of 
Italian painters and sculptors) that [was] closely linked to an increasing awareness 
of the cultural context of ideas…and scientific curiosity. The second factor was a 
period of rapid economic expansion carried by a new class of international 
merchants. Commerce became organized around tradefairs which created an 
efficient distribution structure for new ideas[.] […]The third factor was the 
                                                          
1
 Alina Ng, Copyright Law and the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2011): 76-77. 
2
 Ibid., 79. 
  
 
 
 
3 
invention of a technology enabling the fast and efficient reproduction of ideas: 
Gutenberg’s printing press.3 
On the subject of the phrase and general concept of “intellectual property,” Alex 
Cummings has noted that the phrase “intellectual property,” while appearing only once in 
federal court proceedings prior to 1900 and in no instances at all from the period of 1900 
to 1930, appeared in such documents over 800 times during the 1990s, thus 
demonstrating the development and refined understanding of this concept over the course 
of American legal history.
4
 
The Constitution of the United States (hereinafter “the Constitution”) provides, in 
Article 1, Section 1, Clause 8, that the United States Congress (hereinafter “Congress”) 
shall have the power to “promote the progress of Science and [the] useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”5 The legislative intent for securing this right on the 
part of the framers of the Constitution most likely stems, at least in part, from that which 
attended the passage of the earlier legislation in Britain. The matter is by no means clear 
cut. Indeed, as Irah Donner observed, “there was no recorded debate in the Constitutional 
Convention on September 5, 1787 when the proposed copyright clause was presented, 
[yet] the clause was approved unanimously.”6 While acknowledging the absence of 
                                                          
3
 Martin Kretschmer, “Intellectual Property in Music:  A Historical Analysis of Rhetoric and 
Institutional Practices,” Studies in Cultures, Organizations, and Societies 6 (2000): 205. 
4
 Alex S. Cummings, “From Monopoly to Intellectual Property: Music Piracy and the Remaking 
of American Copyright, 1909-1971,” The Journal of American History 97 (December 2010): 677-
678. Cited from Christopher May and Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Rights: A Critical 
History (Boulder, 2006), 18. 
5
 Cited in Ng, Copyright Law, 84. 
6
 Irah Donner, “The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include it 
with Unanimous Approval?” The American Journal of Legal History 36 (July 1992): 361. 
  
 
 
 
4 
written records that could confirm the legislative intent, Donner proposes that one 
possible reason for its passage was that 
because the states were influenced by the development of the copyright laws of 
England. […] [Another is] that the framers of the Constitution were very anxious 
for the United States to be culturally competitive with the other countries of the 
world. There was a great feeling that the copyright laws would encourage authors 
to write and would be one avenue of attaining this goal of cultural 
competitiveness. [Of larger significance for the perspective of rights within the 
new nation], the states felt a strong need for national copyright laws to secure for 
authors their property rights in their works. […] This emphasis on protecting the 
author’s property rights is harmonious with the larger theme of republicanism 
[which the framers were advancing.]”7    
Subsequent to the ratification of the Constitution in 1788, containing the powers 
to bestow copyright protection to the literary and artistic works through Article 1, Section 
8, Clause 8, the Copyright Act of 1790 was passed. Among other benefits, restrictions, 
and penalties, this Act provided that 
from and after the passing of this act, the author and authors of any map, chart, 
book or books already printed within these United States, being a citizen or 
citizens thereof…and any other person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of 
these United States…who hath or have purchased or legally required the 
copyright of any such map, chart, book or books, in order to print, reprint, publish 
or vend the same, shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, 
publishing and vending such map, chart, book or books, for the term of fourteen 
years from the recording of the title thereof.
8
 
Proceeding to the next important stage in the history of American copyright, we 
find the amendment of 1802 to the original Act of 1790. While the range of media for 
artistic or literary production and reproduction at this time was still quite limited, it is 
important to consider how the 1802 amendment affords protection for the “designing, 
                                                          
7
 Ibid., 361-362.  
8
 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to 
the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) 
at 124. 
  
 
 
 
5 
engraving, and etching [of] historical prints” in addition to the media already protected.9 
This is clearly an exercise in the expansion of a previously granted right through the 
power of Congress to promote the “Progress of Science and the Useful Arts,”10 and is a 
clear indication of the framers’ original intent to allow for subsequently developed media 
of production and reproduction to be afforded the necessary legal protection. 
Returning to the notion that writers and other artistic creators have an inherent 
property right in their work, which continued to resonate through the literary and political 
spheres of the United States, it is important to consider the efforts of Noah Webster who, 
through his “crusade for copyright,”11 attempted to secure a copyright for an English 
language textbook he had written. Webster’s views as to this supposed right are 
poignantly conveyed in a letter to Daniel Webster, at the time a member of the United 
States House of Representatives, on September 30, 1826.  
Among all the modes of acquiring property, or exclusive ownership, the act of 
operation of creating or making seems to have the first claim. If anything can 
justly give a man an exclusive right to the occupancy and enjoyment of a thing, it 
must be the fact that he has made it. The right of the farmer and mechanic to the 
exclusive enjoyment and right of disposal of what they make or produce, is never 
questioned. What then can make a difference between the produce of muscular 
strength and the produce of the intellect? […] 
Upon what principle, let me ask, can my fellow-citizens declare that the 
productions of the farmer and the artisan shall be protected by common law or the 
principles or natural or social right, without a special statute, and without paying a 
premium for the enjoyment of their property; while they declare that I have only a 
temporary right to the fruits of my labor [as indicated by Article 1, Section 8, 
Clause 8] and even this cannot be enjoyed without a premium? Are such 
                                                          
9
 An Act supplementary to an act, entitled “An Act for the encouragement of learning, by 
securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and proprietors of such copies 
during the time therein mentioned,” and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, 
engraving, and etching historical and other prints, 2 Stat. 171 (1802) at 171. 
10
 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
11
 Donner, “The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution,” 370. 
  
 
 
 
6 
principles as these consistent with the established doctrines of property and moral 
right and wrong among an enlightened people? Are such principles consistent 
with the high and honorable notions of justice and equal privileges, which our 
citizens claim to entertain and to cherish, as characteristic of modern 
improvements in civil society?
12
  
After appealing to a commonly understood natural right to strict control over the 
products of one’s own manual and creative labors, Noah Webster makes an entreaty for 
the stricter copyright protection to be made available by improvements to previously 
passed legislation. 
I sincerely wish our legislators would come at once to the line of right and justice 
on this subject, and pass a new act, the preamble to which shall admit the 
principle that an author has, by common law, or natural justice, the sole and 
permanent right to make profits by his own labors, and that his heirs and assigns, 
shall enjoy the right, unclogged with conditions.
13
 
What resulted was an additional amendment to the original Act of 1790 that was 
passed on February 3, 1831. Among the various benefits, restrictions, and penalties 
conferred by this amendment are the following provisions which still further expand the 
range of applicable media and their resultant creative content under copyright protection: 
From the passing of this act, any person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of 
the United States, or resident therein, who shall be the author or authors of any 
book or books, map, chart, or musical composition, which may be now made or 
composed, and not printed or published, […] or who shall invent, design, etch, 
engrave, work, or cause to be engraved, etched, or worked from his own design, 
any print or engraving…shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, 
reprinting, publishing, and vending such book or books, map, chart, musical 
composition, print, cut, or engraving…for the term of twenty-eight years from the 
time of recording the title thereof.
14
 
                                                          
12
 Horace E. Scudder, American Men of Letters: Noah Webster (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1890), 58-59. 
13
 Ibid., 61. 
14
 Emphasis added. An Act to amend the several acts respecting copy rights, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) at 
436. 
  
 
 
 
7 
On March 3, 1865, a supplemental act to this amendment was passed which 
provided for the inclusion of photographic materials under copyright protection. It 
provides 
that the provisions of said act shall extend to and include photographs and the 
negatives thereof which shall hereafter be made, and shall enure to the benefit of 
the authors of the same in the same manner, and to the same extent, and upon the 
same conditions as to the authors of prints and engravings.
15
 
It is important to make reference to the Third Circuit ruling in Edison v Lubin 
from 1903, which illustrates, once again and even more clearly, the unambiguous 
intention of the framers to include subsequently developed media of production and 
reproduction within copyright protection. This was so even for those they could not 
possibly have foreseen, and even “in the same manner, and to the same extent, and upon 
the same conditions”16 as those with which they already were familiar. As the Court 
wrote,  
When Congress, in recognition of the photographic art, saw fit in 1865 to amend 
the act of 1831 and extend copyright protection to a photograph or negative, it is 
not to be presumed it thought such art could not progress, and that no protection 
was to be afforded such progress. […] While such advance has resulted in a 
different type of photograph, yet it is none the less a photograph—a picture 
produced by photographic process.
17
 
 
                                                          
15
 An Act entitled “An Act to amend the several acts respecting copyright,” approved February 
third, eighteen hundred and thirty-one, and to the Acts in addition thereto and Amendment thereof, 
13 Stat. 540 (1865) at 540. 
16
 This phrase was, of course, not used in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution. 
However, the “spirit” behind it was already postulated within the text of Article 1, Section 8, 
Clause 8 as it makes specific reference to the ability of Congress to promote the “Progress of 
Science and the Useful Arts.” I do not wish to be erroneously construed as attributing the phrase 
footnoted above to the framers, since it clearly was not their phrase. However, given their 
permission for the “progress” of the arts, it is reasonable to propose that the inclusion of 
photographic elements, had they known of them, would have met with their approval. 
17
 Emphasis added. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240, 242 (1903). 
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As public performances of musical compositions for profit increased, the belief 
that compositions were worthy of more stringent copyright protections strengthened. In 
sentiments somewhat similar to those of Noah Webster more than 80 years before, a man 
named Mr. J. L. Tinsdale,
18
 identified as representative of the G. Schirmer Music 
Publishing Company, presented his concerns about this issue before the House of 
Representatives Committee on Patents in May of 1906. The exchange below, between 
Mr. Tinsdale and the Chairman of the Committee, is instructive not only for the particular 
concerns raised by Mr. Tinsdale, but also for the conceptual distinctions between musical 
compositions and the products of other artistic media such that additional or special 
copyright protections for the former are warranted. In Mr. Tinsdale’s remarks, we have 
an insistence that the protection afforded by copyright should be extended to the 
execution of performances as well as the material reproduction of those musical 
compositions. 
Mr. Tinsdale: A musical composition is something which is intangible, the 
creation of a composer’s brain, reduced to paper by certain symbols or characters 
forming what we call a book, or, technically speaking, when applied to larger 
works, a…score. Such a book, containing the symbols or characters referred to, 
merely represents certain musical sounds and is incomplete until those musical 
sounds are reproduced by a combination of human voices or voices and musical 
instruments. For this reason we claim that the copyright issued to the author, 
composer, or his assigns must and should include the right of performance; that 
the author’s control is not limited to the physical and tangible book of symbols 
but extends through the completed performance. This was plainly the intent of the 
statute when it was enacted, and we should consider it a reversal of the spirit and 
intention of the law to have any part of his copyright privileges removed.   
Mr. Chairman: In other words, the property itself does not carry with it the right 
to use it. 
Mr. Tinsdale: That is the point. […] It is the product of his brain, and it is not 
completed until you have given a public performance of it.  
                                                          
18
 Or in some places in the report, “Tinsdale.” 
  
 
 
 
9 
Mr. Goldfogle: Would not the same rule practically apply to a very fine painting? 
You would not shut off the right of anybody looking at it, would you, or of its 
being exhibited at any place? 
Mr. Tinsdale: No sir; that is different.
19
  
With both concerns in mind, and with a cognizance of the changing nature of 
artistic and literary production and reproduction, a pivotal development in the history of 
American copyright law was the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909. As the range of 
media for producing and reproducing artistic and literary works expanded due to 
considerable technological advancements in the preceding decades, Congress expressed 
its opinion that the existing copyright legislation required extensive modifications. As a 
Mr. Currier from the Committee on Patents stated in the House Report no. 1 on the 
Copyright Act of 1909, “for years men familiar with the copyright laws of this country 
have urged the necessity of a complete revision.”20 Mr. Currier then quotes from 
statements made by the Honorable Samuel J. Elder before the Maine State Bar 
Association in which he attests to this necessity in greater detail. In this particular 
address, Mr. Elder stated that  
the whole system, in the light of an interpretation by the courts, call[s] for a 
revision. The courts are more and more called upon to consider these questions. 
And besides this, the reproduction of various things which are the subject of 
copyright has enormously increased. The wealth and business of the country and 
                                                          
19
 “Argument on H. R. 11943, to Amend Title 60, Chapter 3, of Revised Statutes of the United 
States, Relating to Copyrights,” in Arguments Before the Committee on Patents of the House of 
Representatives on H. R. 11943, To Amend Title 60, Chapter 3, of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States Relating to Copyrights, author or editor not indicated (Washington, D.C. 
Government Printing Office, 1906), 15-16. 
20
 Author not indicated, Statement of Mr. Currier of the House of Representatives Committee on 
Patents in “The House Report 1 on the Copyright Act of 1909: To Amend and Consolidate the 
Acts Respecting Copyright,” page 1. Accessed November 1, 2013, 
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/copyrights/The%20House%20Report%201%20on%20the
%20Copyright%20Act%20of%201909.pdf. (University of New Hampshire School of Law, “IP 
Mall” (Intellectual Property library)) (Hereinafter “The House Report”) 
  
 
 
 
10 
the methods and means of duplication have increased immeasurably. The law 
requires adaptation to these modern conditions.
21
 
Among other benefits, restrictions, and penalties, this Act provided that 
any person entitled [hereto], upon complying with the provisions of this Act, shall 
have the exclusive right […] e) to perform the copyrighted work publicly for 
profit if it be a musical composition and for the purpose of a public performance 
for profit; and for the purposes set forth…to make any arrangement or setting of it 
or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the 
thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or 
reproduced. Provided, that the provisions of this Act, so far as they secure 
copyright controlling the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically 
the musical work, shall include only compositions published and copyrighted after 
this Act goes into effect.
22
 
References to the mechanical “reproduction” of musical works occur again in the 
Act. One such passage is the following, which demonstrates the willingness of Congress 
to consider the means of the “mechanical reproduction” of the musical works, as well as 
the musical works themselves, as potentially subject to copyright legislation. 
Whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used or permitted the use of the 
copyrighted work upon the parts of musical instruments serving to reproduce 
mechanically the musical work, then in the case of infringement of such copyright 
by the unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of interchangeable parts, such as 
disks, rolls, bands, or cylinders for use in mechanical music-producing machines 
adapted to reproduce the copyrighted music, […] an injunction may be granted 
upon such terms as the court may impose.
23
 
The language of the paragraph above is ambiguous. On the one hand, the phrase 
“musical instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work,” may be 
understood to mean those instruments used for the purpose of actually performing the 
written composition—that this, perhaps, is subject to the copyright legislation and 
perhaps to various associated procedures and expenses. On the other hand, the paragraph 
includes the phrase “disks, rolls, bands, or cylinders for use in mechanical music-
                                                          
21
 Ibid., 1. 
22
 Emphasis added. An Act to amend and consolidate the acts respecting copyright, 35 Stat. 1075 
(1909) at 1081. (Hereafter “Amend and Consolidate”). 
23
 Ibid.  
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producing machines adapted to reproduce copyrighted music,” which most likely refers 
to objects made for the purpose of playing mechanically inscribed recordings of the 
music on the early radios or phonographs. If this is the case, then it would seem to 
indirectly state that unauthorized commercial use of a presumably lawful (“authorized”) 
recording of the musical composition would be actionable under the existing copyright 
legislation. Does this mean that a copyright could actually be placed upon a recording so 
as to prevent or at least punish its unauthorized commercial usage? Or does it merely 
mean that an injunction could be placed against the perpetrator of such conduct as a 
matter of law while there would be no official copyright placed on the recording itself? A 
definitive understanding of what the statute provides is not as clear-cut as one would like. 
It is reasonable to propose, for instance, that the imposition of penalties for the 
unauthorized commercial use of an otherwise authorized recording (the mechanical 
reproduction mentioned at the beginning of the above referenced paragraph) might 
presuppose the existence of a copyright on the recording, but this is not unambiguously 
stated. Complicating things even further, Ronald Mark Wells has stated that  
special interest groups successfully lobbied Congress to exclude sound recordings 
from federal copyright protection under the Copyright Act of 1909. Congress 
based their early exclusion of sound recordings in large part on the copyright 
clause of the Constitution.
24
 […] Therefore, Congress only extended copyright 
protection to creations which shared similar characteristics with books or 
writings. Consequently, Congress denied copyright protection to sound recordings 
because they were recorded on record discs and could not be seen or perceived[,] 
[but did include musical compositions.]
25
    
                                                          
24
 Such a reading is obviously a very literal reading of “Writings,” but perhaps ignores other 
significant words in the clause such as “Progress” and “Discoveries.” 
25
 Ronald Mark Wells, “You Can’t Always Get What You Want, But Digital Sampling Can Get 
You What You Need!” Akron Law Review 22 (1988-1989): 696-697. 
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While it is clear that the performances of musical compositions became the 
subject of this new Copyright Act, the status of recordings, presumably identified as 
“mechanical reproductions” is harder to determine given the interpretative issues 
associated with the terms of the statute as well as Wells’ contentions for the exclusion of 
sound recordings under the terms of the Act. This confusion is not at all surprising. It 
seems to be a reflection of the difficulties faced by the Congress during the time of the 
drafting of this Act because of the conceptual complications that arose by the 
introduction of technologies for “mechanical reproduction” and how that might have 
affected the range of media protectable under copyright legislation. As Mr. Currier stated 
later in the House Report 1 on the Copyright Act of 1909, 
[the] section[s] of the bill which [deal] with the reproduction of music by 
mechanical means ha[ve] been the subject[s] of more discussion and [have] taken 
more of the time of the committee than any other provision[s] in the bill. Many 
propositions looking to a solution of this question have been submitted and 
discussed, and much difficulty has been experienced in reaching an agreement. 
[…] No legislative body in the world has as yet taken such advanced ground in 
the line of securing the rights of composers in the matter of reproduction by 
mechanical means of their music as is contemplated by this bill. […] The main 
object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to music has been 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The fact that musical compositions were included under the terms of the Act of 1909 means that, 
according to the perspective of Congress referred to by Wells, Congress considered musical 
compositions to be sufficiently similar to literary books so as to warrant their inclusion under the 
Act. Interestingly, the late 18
th
-century courts in Britain were of a similar persuasion, as relayed 
by Martin Kretschmer. Kretschmer makes reference to the matter of Bach v Longmann of 1773, 
which is reported, in part, as follows: 
“Lord Mansfield called on Mr. Wood [attorney for the defendant] to begin; and without hearing 
Mr. Robinson [attorney for the plaintiff] in answer, said, the case was so clear and the arguments 
such, that it was difficult to speak seriously upon it. The words of the Act of Parliament [the 
Statute of Anne] are very large: ‘books and other writings.’ It is not confined to language or 
letters. Music is a science; it may be written; and the mode of conveying the ideas, is by signs and 
marks. […] There is no colour for saying that music is not within the Act. Afterwards, […] the 
Court certified in these words, ‘Having heard counsel and considered the case, we are of the 
opinion, that a musical composition is a writing within the Statute of the 8
th
 Queen of Anne.’” 
Kretschmer, “Intellectual Property in Music,” 209.  
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to give the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition, and it 
has been a serious and a difficult task to combine the protection of the composer 
with the protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would accomplish 
the double purpose of securing to the composer an adequate return for all use 
made of his compositions and at the same time prevent the formation of 
oppressive monopolies.
26
 
 Nevertheless, considering “mechanical reproduction” of music under copyright 
legislation, to whatever extent that can be definitively ascertained, was prescient of the 
developments that would eventually obtain with respect to recordings of musical 
compositions, such as those that occur in the next two copyright acts under consideration. 
 The Sound Recordings Act of 1971, applicable to recordings “fixed” on or after 
February 15, 1972, and addressing the rights to engage in certain commercial conduct 
with respect to recordings of musical compositions, and not merely musical compositions 
themselves, provides the right to  
reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of the copyrighted work if it be a sound 
recording: Provided, that the exclusive right of the owner of a copyright in a 
sound recording to reproduce it is limited to the right to duplicate the sound 
recording in a tangible form that directly or indirectly recaptures the actual sounds 
fixed in the recording: Provided further, That this right does not extend to the 
making or duplication of another sound recording that is an independent fixation 
of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the 
copyrighted sound recording.
27
 
The Copyright Act of 1976 is another pivotal development in American copyright 
legislation, as it expressly clarifies the protectability of musical compositions as “musical 
works, including any accompanying sounds,” as well as “sound recordings” as separate 
items protected by copyright legislation. Sound recordings are defined in the Act as  
                                                          
26
 The House Report, 5. 
27
 An Act to amend Title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation of a limited 
copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication and 
piracy of sound recordings, and for other purposes, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) at 391. 
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works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, 
but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual 
works, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or 
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
28
  
Cummings explains that “the copyrighting of recorded sound validated a rationale 
for ownership that had evolved in courts and stage legislatures over several decades.”29 
The House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 contains the following statements in 
support of the need to expand it so as to accommodate the increasingly disseminated 
technological media for producing and reproducing musical compositions which 
warranted their own special copyright protections. 
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of 
works accorded protection, and the subject matter affected by this expansion has 
fallen into two general categories. In the first, scientific discoveries and 
technological developments have made possible new forms of creative expression 
that never existed before. In some of these cases the new expressive forms—
electronic music, film-strips, and computer programs, for example—could be 
regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already 
intended to protect, and were thus considered copyrightable from the outset 
without the need of new legislation. In other cases, such as photographs, sound 
recordings, and motion pictures, statutory enactment was deemed necessary to 
give them full recognition as copyrightable works.
30
 
This Act is significant for its inclusion of sound recordings as “works” as well as 
the musical compositions that they contain. The Act defines “works” in the following 
way: “a work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a 
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of 
                                                          
28
 Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. §101 (1976) at p. 1033 (hereafter “Copyrights”) 
29
 Cummings, “From Monopoly to Intellectual Property,” 680. 
30
 “House Report on Chapter 1, Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976,” in U.S. Copyright 
Documents: An Annotated Collection for Use by Educators and Librarians, edited by Jerome K. 
Miller (Littleton, Colorado: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 1981), 69.  
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more than transitory duration.”31 A strictly grammatical reading of this sentence may 
reasonably lead one to believe that the musical composition itself is the “work” which is 
to be subsequently “fixed” to a another medium, since the opening clause reads not “a 
work is a ‘fixed’ tangible medium of expression,” but rather “a work is ‘fixed’ in a 
tangible medium of expression.” However, the Act goes on to provide that “a work 
consisting of sounds, images, or both [as a sound recording clearly is] that are being 
transmitted [for which purpose a sound recording clearly exists] is ‘fixed’ for purposes of 
this title.”32 In this manner, the Congress contemplated copyright protection for both 
musical compositions and the sound recordings that contain them. The independent and 
interdependent nature of these two entities, and the copyrights granted to them, will be 
considered throughout the duration of this thesis. 
                                                          
31
 “Copyrights,” p. 1032. 
32
 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF DIGITAL SAMPLING, INCLUDING LITIGATION 
THAT IT HAS INSPIRED 
 
This chapter will address the history of digital sampling, beginning first with a discussion 
of its compositional antecedents in purely written notation and progressing, 
chronologically, to the advent of the technologically based practice of sampling in both 
musical composition and recording. An array of lawsuits that have been initiated as a 
result of the sampling process will be presented, and will also proceed from cases which 
entailed instances of sampling in the purely written sense, prior to the advent of recording 
and sampling technology, and progressing, chronologically, through various cases 
involving this technology. The often pernicious ontological and functional distinction 
between musical compositions and the recordings that contain them will also be 
addressed as it stands as a complicating factor in not only the litigation that has ensued 
due to digital sampling, but also in the very conceptualization of the practice.  
Will Fulford-Jones defines sampling as a “process in which a sound is taken 
directly from a recorded medium and transposed into a new recording.”1 While the 
available mechanisms and procedures for accomplishing the goal of appropriating pre-
existing musical materials into one’s own, new composition have changed considerably 
even over the course of the last few decades Mark Katz observes that the practice of 
“sampling,” understood as a simpler practice of pen and paper and in the absence of 
                                                          
1
 Will Fulford-Jones, “Sampling,” in The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, edited 
by Stanley Sadie (London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 2001), 219. 
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advanced technology, had been conducted for more than a thousand years prior to the 
present era. According to Katz,  
Medieval chants freely incorporated and adapted melodic patterns from earlier 
chants; dozens of Renaissance masses were based on the melody of the secular 
song ‘L’homme armé;” a similar craze raged centuries later when composers such 
as Berlioz, Liszt, Rachmaninoff, Saint-Saëns, and Ysaÿe sampled the chant Dies 
Irae (“The Day of Wrath”) in their instrumental works; Bach reworked Vivaldi’s 
music, and more than a century later Gounod returned the favor, adding a new 
melody to Bach’s Prelude in C Major and calling it “Ave Maria;” Mahler 
cannibalized his own earlier vocal works in several of his symphonies; Ives 
quoted George M. Cohan’s “Over There” in his song “Tom Sails Away;” Bartok 
parodied Shostakovich’s Leningrad symphony in his Concerto for Orchestra; and 
so on and so on.
2
 
Katz also summarizes the computational and other technological mechanisms by 
which digital sampling has been performed. Katz’s summary is worth quoting at length. 
Digital sampling is a type of computer synthesis in which sound is rendered into 
data, data that in turn comprise instructions for reconstructing that sound. […] 
Regardless of the gear, on the simplest level sampling works like a jigsaw puzzle: 
a sound is cut up into pieces and then put back together to form a digitized 
“picture” of that sound. When a sound wave is digitized, using what is called an 
analog-to-digital converter (ADC), it is not reproduced in its entirety; rather, 
select “samples” of the wave are assigned binary numbers. Each of these numbers 
represents the amplitude, or height, of a wave at a given point. When a sound is 
reconstructed, a digital-to-analog (DAC) converter emits voltages corresponding 
to each of these binary numbers. When all of these various voltages are emitted in 
a particular order, the result very closely approximates the original. […] 
The advantage of digitization is that sound, once rendered into data, can be 
manipulated in a variety of ways down to the smallest details. Tempo and pitch 
can be increased or decreased in any increment, and the two can be manipulated 
independently. […] Sounds can be reversed, cut, looped, and layered; 
reverberation can be added; certain frequencies within a sound can be boosted or 
de-emphasized. […] All of these manipulations can be performed on any sound, 
musical or otherwise, and on any length of sound that can be recorded.
3
  
Modern sampling was first practiced by Jamaican disc jockeys who combined 
excerpts of pre-existing recordings, thereby creating “new” ones upon which additional 
                                                          
2
 Mark Katz, Capturing Sound: How Technology Has Changed Music (Berkeley, California: The 
University of California Press, 2010), 148-149. 
3
 Ibid., 147-148. 
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vocals were then layered.
4
 The first instance of digital sampling to attain international 
prominence was in the song “Rapper’s Delight” by the Sugarhill Gang in 1979. 
Subsequently, Grandmaster Flash engaged in sampling by appropriating passages from 
the works of Chic, Queen, Blondie, Spoonie Gee, and the Sugarhill Gang in his 
“Adventures of Grandmaster Flash on the Wheels of Steel.”5 It should be noted that 
through these and other more recent examples, the sampling process is not merely an act 
of exact reproduction of material from a previously composed piece. The techniques of 
reversing, cutting, looping, and layering referred to above by Katz are tantamount to 
“transformative…recontextualization[s]” of the original material.6 Additionally, I will 
examine the various legal and ethical complexities surrounding the sampling process and 
discuss several instances of litigation that have implicated them. For now, it is enough to 
call attention to a curious complication that has disrupted established conceptions of 
music and recording that sampling has engendered.  
In addition to the technological innovations that make digital sampling possible in 
the first place, the significance of sampling for contemporary compositions is that the 
process entails a critical re-examination of one of the fundamental conceptual 
dichotomies of American copyright law—that between ideas, which are not protectable, 
and the manner of the expression of those ideas, which are.
7
  The Copyright Act of 1976 
provides that “in no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
                                                          
4Jeremy Scott Sykes, “Copyright—The De Minimis Defense in Copyright Infringement Actions 
Involving Musical Sampling,” University of Memphis Law Review 36 (Spring 2006): 757.  
5
 Colin Larkin, “Sampling,” in The Encyclopedia of Popular Music, edited by Colin Larkin (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 237-238. 
6
 Katz, Capturing Sound, 174-175. 
7
 Ibid., 175. 
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extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, 
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such [a] work.”8 However, Mark Katz identifies how the sampling process 
fundamentally disrupts the stability of this distinction as it would relate to musical 
compositions and the sound recordings that contain them. 
The dichotomy is not always so clear-cut, but digital sampling muddies the 
distinction almost beyond recognition. [Considering one example], Trouble 
Funk’s 1982 song “Pump Me UP” is obviously not an abstract idea but a concrete 
expression. But does the passage sampled in Public Enemy’s “Fight the Power” 
remain Trouble Funk’s expression when it no longer bears any resemblance to its 
unaltered state? Isn’t Public Enemy’s use of that sound an expression distinct 
from Trouble Funk’s? And if so, doesn’t that make the Trouble Funk song the raw 
material of an idea for Public Enemy? […] The potential collapse of the idea-
expression dichotomy would have considerable ramifications for copyright law 
because expressions are legally protected but ideas are not.
9
 
 In this context, it is instructive to consider the underlying philosophical and 
cultural shifts that occurred concurrently to the development and ascendancy of the 
sampling process. Simon Waters has identified seven such trends, four of which are of 
particular relevance to this thesis. The first is the new technologies of sampling 
themselves. Waters explains how the rapid digitization of information and the resulting 
changes in communications, work environments, and disciplinary languages and 
practices have the potential to “radically restructure activities like composing and 
listening.”10 The second is the idea of cultural pluralism with particular application to 
musical practice. Waters explains how the manifestation of cultural pluralism, 
particularly by way of an “incredible hybridisation” of musical styles from various 
                                                          
8
 “Copyrights,” p. 1039 
9
 Katz, Capturing Sound, 175. 
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 Simon Waters, “Beyond the Acousmatic: hybrid tendencies in electroacoustic music,” in Music, 
Electronic Media and Culture, edited by Simon Emmerson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 58. 
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cultures in contemporary composition has allowed for the “recontextualization[…], easy 
manipulation, transformation and juxtaposition” of the musical conventions of the wider 
cultural array by the technological means of sampling.
11
 The third is modifications of 
previously held beliefs as to the proper “authority” of an artistic creator over his work 
and the concomitant marginalization of people or groups from musical practice that did 
not share the same views. Waters explains how the technological mechanisms associated 
with the sampling process have allowed for the pursuit of artistic activities for people 
previously marginalized from such participation. Waters clarifies the cultural 
ramifications of these tendencies as “threat[ening] to those power elites who have 
justif[ied] their [own] privileged status.”12 The fourth and final shift is in the shifts in 
both philosophical and professional perspectives on musical practice. Waters explains 
how the advent of postmodernism in its various conceptual appearances has changed our 
perception of the meaning of what is communicated by the newer methods of 
dissemination. He identifies the fundamental contrast between postmodernism’s 
emphasis on the context of communication and modernism’s emphasis on the innovation 
itself and the potentially endless improvement of the methods of communication, and 
argues that the former is a philosophical undercurrent to the sampling process.  
As a result, the artefacts of the past reappear in new permutations and all 
historical periods are regarded as potential contemporary material. New methods 
of dissemination…tend to stress this simultaneous availability of times and 
cultures while also drawing attention to the principle of recontextualization: 
Madonna in a Cathedral; William Byrd on an aeroplane; Sarajevo in your sitting 
room.
13
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In addition to such philosophical considerations, it is important to highlight a 
significant political aspect of the sampling process—political insofar as it relates to issues 
of class and culturally specific consciousness and empowerment. As Adam Haupt has 
pointed out,  
one key difference between the rise of the mp3 revolution and the use of digital 
sampling in hip-hop is that hip-hop artists make informed artistic/political choices 
when using samples during the construction of a new music text, whereas audio 
piracy on the Internet offers consumers a new means of [purely] consuming 
commodities. […] Sampling in rap is [often] a process of cultural literacy and 
intertextual reference that celebrates black artistic achievement and challenges 
audiences to “know these sounds,” […] thereby affirming “black musical 
history.”14 
As can be expected, the practice of digital sampling raises a variety of ethical and 
legal issues, since it involves the appropriation of the musical material of works by one 
composer, frequently without their consent, for a new work by another composer. Before 
proceeding to a presentation of the case upon which this thesis is mostly focused, Grand 
Upright Music Limited v Warner Brothers Records, Inc., it is instructive to present a 
small survey of musical infringement suits throughout American legal history. Through 
this survey of cases, and whether in terms of exact replication or of a modification of 
other material that is still deemed sufficiently “substantially similar” to warrant litigation, 
one can discern how courts have addressed this practice and resolved the disputes 
involved prior to our major case and even prior to the advent of digital sampling.  
The first in our survey is the matter of Boosey et al v. Empire Music, Inc., decided 
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on February 11, 
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1915. In this case, Boosey filed suit against Empire because the latter had published a 
composition entitled “Tennessee, I Hear You Calling Me,” which was said to infringe the 
copyright that was placed, through the terms of the Copyright Act of 1909, on the work “I 
Hear You Calling Me,” published by the former. Infringement was said to exist by virtue 
of the latter’s title which includes one of the most significant lines of text in the former’s 
composition and also because the same music which accompanies that line in the former 
is also used in the corresponding portions of the latter. Judge Mayer made clear in his 
decision that while the “dignified character” of the former and the “ragtime [character]” 
of the latter, as well as the corresponding differences in the overall theme of either work, 
render them “considerably different in theme and execution,” “it is enough to warrant the 
charge of piracy and infringement of copyright that the words ‘I Hear You Calling Me,’ 
with practically identical music accompanying them, appear in the two songs, and are the 
main thing that impresses one technically untutored.”15 
The comments by the Judge highlight two fundamental principles that would 
prove significant for future cases. First, the sheer quantity of the appropriated material is 
not the dispositive factor in determining whether infringement of the copyright that 
protected it had occurred. Rather, of greater importance is the significance of the used 
material for the composition as a whole. “I Hear You Calling Me,” while arguably a 
quantitatively inconsequential amount of material, is nevertheless especially crucial to the 
overall “tone” of the composition, as illustrated clearly by its presence within the very 
title of the work. Therefore, Empire’s use of this material “warrants the charge of piracy 
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and infringement of copyright.” Second the use of material of such contextual 
significance can be discerned even by one “technically untutored,” since its use, and the 
importance of the material to the whole composition, is so obvious as to not require any 
specialized musical knowledge for its detection. 
However, the matter was not so swiftly resolved. Judge Mayer, after rightly 
emphasizing the legal actionability of Empire’s actions, went on to explain how 
extraneous commercial concerns could disrupt the ability to proceed with the imposition 
of penalties against them. Notwithstanding the legal basis for such penalties, “these cases 
must be viewed and dealt with from a practical standpoint. Songs of this character usually 
have a temporary vogue, and, if the sale is stopped just at the time that the public is keen, 
serious injury may be done, even though a plaintiff gives a bond or undertaking to 
respond.”16 Further proceedings on this matter were deferred to a later period, 
demonstrating that some courts, during the nascent period of the implementation of the 
Copyright Act of 1909—an Act whose construction was heavily motivated by the need to 
afford greater protection for musical compositions—were not entirely clear as to how to 
properly address circumstances such as those which arose in the Boosey case. Subsequent 
cases would present courts with the opportunity to clarify their strategies of determining 
whether particular instances of infringement would be punishable under the governing 
copyright statutes and how they were to be remedied. 
Nearly ten years after the Boosey case, there appeared Fred Fisher, Inc., v. 
Dillingham, et al, also decided by the United States District Court for the Southern 
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District of New York on January 26, 1924. This case presented an instance of alleged 
musical copyright infringement under curious circumstances. The plaintiff brought suit 
against the others for the allegedly deliberate infringement by Joe Kern, in the scene 
called “Kalua” from his light opera “Good Morning, Dearie,” of a previously composed 
work by another composer entitled “Dardanella.” The reason for this claim was that both 
works contained the same eight-note ostinato, even though Kern insisted that he did not 
intentionally appropriate the plaintiff’s musical material, but rather concocted it 
independently through his own artistic ingenuity. Judge Learned Hand expressed 
skepticism over such a proposition. 
Not only is the figure in each piece exactly alike, but it is used in the same way; 
that is, as an “ostinato” accompaniment. Further, the defendant [Kern] [has] been 
able to discover in earlier popular music neither this figure, nor even any 
“ostinato” accompaniment whatever. The fact that “Kalua” appeared shortly after 
“Dardanella” had faded out, and was written by one who had necessarily known 
it, as a musician knew it, makes it still more hard to assume any independent 
provenience for “Kalua.” Can I suppose that such parallelism could be the result 
of coincidence only?
17
 
Nevertheless, Judge Hand emphasized the scope of the Copyright Act of 1909 to 
encompass instances of infringement, even when unintentional, as pure matters of law. 
 On the issue of infringement this conclusion is enough. The point is a new one, 
but I think it is plain. The author’s copyright is an absolute right to prevent others 
from copying his original collocation of words or notes, and does not depend 
upon the infringer’s good faith. Once it appears that another has in fact used the 
copyright[ed material] as the source of his production, he has invaded the author’s 
rights. It is no excuse that in so doing his memory has played him a trick. In an 
indictment under [the] Copyright Act…the excuse might be a defense, since the 
infringement would not be willful; but it is seldom that a tort, as this is, depends 
on the purpose of the wrongdoer. Therefore I find with the plaintiff on the issue of 
infringement.
18
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 After opining that a matter such as this was “a mere point of honor, or scarcely 
more than irritation, [and] involving no substantial interest,”19 Judge Hand once again 
asserts the actionability of Kern’s conduct, whether intentional or otherwise, and 
accordingly awarded the plaintiff the statutorily prescribed monetary award. In contrast to 
Judge Mayer in the case previously presented, Judge Hand did not allow for extraneous 
commercial considerations to hinder the resolution of this matter, even expressly 
rejecting their significance to the ability for judgment to be entered against Kern, and 
thereby also asserted the applicability of copyright legislation to issues that trigger it.  
One additional and highly unusual case is relevant here: namely, Bridgeport 
Music, Inc., v. Dimension Films, decided by the Sixth Circuit on September 7, 2004. In 
this matter, Bridgeport Music, Inc. and other plaintiffs filed suit against Dimension Films 
for the latter’s digital sampling of one of the songs whose copyrights are owned by 
Bridgeport, called “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” by George Clinton, Jr. and the 
Funkadelics, for the soundtrack of the movie I Got the Hook Up. Of particular 
significance for the history of musical copyright legislation and litigation is that Judge 
Guy of the Sixth Circuit identified the ownership by Bridgeport of both “musical 
composition and sound recording copyrights”20 that were allegedly infringed, thus 
demonstrating that the composition and the recording that contains it, as postulated under 
the Copyright Act of 1976 and in litigation that is executed under it terms, are two 
separate “works” that are entitled to two distinct copyrights.  
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(hereinafter Bridgeport 2004) 
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It might be argued that an act of digital sampling such as was addressed in this 
case is not qualitatively different from the appropriation of musical material addressed in 
the previous cases that we examined, and that, therefore, the fact that the copying in 
Bridgeport was accomplished through technological means and that that accomplished in 
the earlier cases was done through pen and paper does not warrant some kind of 
additional arbitrative mechanism tailored specifically to it. However, it is important to 
recognize that in Bridgeport, and similar cases, we are dealing with two copyrights—one 
placed on the musical composition and the other placed on the recording that contains it. 
Indeed, the need for extra scrutiny of such situations, made evident by virtue of the 
various legal questions that digital sampling is uniquely capable of posing, was 
acknowledged by Judge Guy during his procedural summary of the prior litigation: “In 
granting summary judgment to defendant, the district court…emphasized the paucity of 
case law on the issue of whether digital sampling amounts to copyright infringement.”21 
Later in the decision, Judge Guy clearly and, for our purposes, significantly 
clarifies the procedural distinction that these two entities warrant.  
At the outset it is important to make clear the precise nature of our decision. […] 
1. The analysis that is appropriate for determining infringement of a musical 
composition copyright is not the analysis that is to be applied to determine 
infringement of a sound recording. We address the issue only as it pertains to 
sound recording copyrights.
22
 […] 
3. […] Having concluded that the statute requires a different analysis for sound 
recording copyrights…we also find that the requirement of originality is met 
                                                          
21
 Bridgeport 2004, at page 395.  
22
 At the corresponding position in the decision itself, Judge Guy includes this footnote: 
“We…exercise our discretion to entertain this argument due to the dearth of legal authority on 
this issue and the importance of the resolution of this issue to the music industry.” 
Ibid., footnote #4. 
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by the fixation of sounds in the master recording. Only an actual physical 
copy of a master recording will be exactly the same as the copyrighted sound 
recording.
23
  
Judge Guy then makes reference to subsection 2 of Section 106 of the Copyright 
Act of 1976, providing “the owner of copyright…the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: [including] prepar[ing] derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work,” which digital sampling clearly entails. He then further clarifies the 
distinction between the nature of a musical composition and a recording that contains it 
for purposes of copyright law.  
If one were to analogize to a book, it is not the book, i.e., the paper and binding, 
that is copyrightable, but its contents. There are probably any number of reasons 
why the decision was made by Congress to treat a sound recording differently 
from a book even though both are the medium in which an original work is fixed 
rather than the creation itself. None the least of them certainly were advances in 
technology which made the “pirating” of sound recordings an easy task.24  
Finally, and of great import in the present context, Judge Guy identified the 
distinction in the methods of analysis that must be performed by a court in determining 
matters of infringement on a musical composition copyright and a sound recording 
copyright. 
While the question [of] whether an unauthorized use of a digital sample infringes 
a musical composition may require a full substantial similarity analysis, the 
question [of] whether the use of a sample constitutes infringement of a sound 
recording could end upon a determination that the sampler physically copied the 
copyrighted sound recordings of another. If the sampler physically copied any 
portion of author’s copyrighted sound recording, then infringement should be 
found.
25
 
That infringement would be found in appropriating any portion of a previously 
produced recording of a composition, even irrespective of the quantitative or qualitative 
                                                          
23
 Ibid., at page 396. 
24
 Ibid., at page 398. 
25
 Emphasis added, Ibid.  
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significance of this portion for the entire composition as written, is an unusual aspect of 
contemporary musical copyright law and will be broached again in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
A HISTORY OF GRAND UPRIGHT MUSIC LIMITED V. WARNER 
BROTHERS RECORDS, INC. AND SOME PRELIMINARY CRITIQUE 
 
The case of Grand Upright Music Limited V. Warner Brothers Records, Inc. can be 
summarized as follows. The rap personality Marcel Theo Hall (b. 1964), known as “Biz 
Markie,” recorded a song entitled “Alone Again” for his album I Need a Haircut in 1991. 
Biz Markie’s recording consisted of the harmonic progression featured in the opening 
bars of the 1972 composition “Alone Again (Naturally)” by Gilbert O’Sullivan.1 This 
harmonic progression was “looped,” or repeated multiple times consecutively, throughout 
Biz Markie’s work. The latter even includes repetitions of the phrase “Alone Again 
(Naturally)” from the original O’Sullivan version. An attorney for Biz Markie provided a 
recording of this version to Terry O’Sullivan, Gilbert’s brother and agent, and inquired 
for permissions to use the sample of this pivotal excerpt and the title phrase. However, 
                                                          
1
 The YouTube video, “Gilbert O’Sullivan-Alone Again (Naturally)-45 RPM Original Mono Mix” 
by user WABCRADIO77 consists of a video recording of the playing of this record, the version 
of which begins with the unaccompanied opening harmonic progression which we have focused 
upon so intently for good reason, on a record player. Prior to placing the record in the record 
player and activating it, the person displays the record up close for the camera. Very clearly 
visible and legible to a viewer are the following identifying labels: “Alone Again (Naturally) 
(O’Sullivan) Gilbert O’Sullivan,” “Pub: Management Agency and Publishing Inc., BMI,” and 
“1972” (the year of its creation and recording.)  
“Gilbert O’Sullivan-Alone Again (Naturally)-45 RPM Original Mono Mix,” 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o41lHnDIPRg (Accessed November 7, 2013) 
The above mentioned information also matches that provided for the 1972 American released 
recording as indicated on discogs.com, and, accordingly, I can conclude that the recording 
featured in the YouTube video mentioned above, which commences directly with the 
unaccompanied opening harmonic progression at issue, is the original recording to which 
listeners would have been exposed, and from which they would be able to discern Biz Markie’s 
appropriations in his own version. 
“Gilbert O’Sullivan-Alone Again (Naturally),” http://www.discogs.com/Gilbert-
OSullivan-Alone-Again-Naturally/release/1721448 (Accessed November 7, 2013) 
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Warner Brothers Records released I Need a Haircut, complete with “Alone Again,” 
before Biz Markie could receive a response, from Terry and Gilbert O’Sullivan. Once 
Gilbert had learned that the recording had been released, he brought suit against Biz 
Markie. Gilbert explained the circumstances leading to this legal action during a live 
interview at Branchange Film Festival in Jersey, United Kingdom in 2010. 
Biz Markie and they [Cold Chillin’ Records] approached us and said, this was in 
1990, that we would like to sample your song and use it on a track. So we said 
okay, and if we like it we'll see where we go from there. They sent it over and 
what they had done was sampled the intro and then he [Biz] rapped over it. 
[…]But then we discovered that he was a comic, a comic rapper, and the one 
thing I am very guarded about is protecting songs and in particular I'll go to my 
grave in defending the song to make sure it is never used in the comic scenario 
which is offensive to those people who bought it for the right reasons. And so 
therefore we refused. But being the kind of people that they were, they decided to 
use it anyway [without permission] so we had to go to court.
2
 
 
The matter was heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York, presided over by Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy. His decision is immediately 
evident from its four opening words: “Thou shalt not steal.”3 As will be explored in more 
detail later, this hasty and ostensibly “blanket” condemnation of the digital sampling 
process is one of the main reasons why this decision has been criticized within the legal-
academic literature. It should be conceded that the judge, as a matter of principle and as a 
matter of statutory law, was right to express his discontent of unauthorized appropriation 
                                                          
2
 “Gilbert O'Sullivan Tells His Side of the Story in Landmark Sampling Court Case Against Biz 
Markie that Changed the Direction of Hip-Hop,” Amoeba Music Blog, 
http://www.amoeba.com/blog/2010/09/jamoeblog/gilbert-o-sullivan-tells-his-side-of-the-story-in-
landmark-sampling-court-case-against-biz-markie-that-changed-the-direction-of-hip-hop.html 
(Accessed November 7, 2013) (cited below as “O’Sullivan Tells His Side.”) 
3
 Grand Upright Music Limited v Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 780 F. Supp 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (Hereinafter Grand Upright). 
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of other musicians’ materials. However, he excluded much that would have perhaps 
clarified his findings in a way that would necessarily involve a method for determining 
instances of infringement or what I shall call “impermissibly excessive borrowing.”4 The 
principal matter that the Court considered was not whether an excessive amount of 
O’Sullivan’s material was sampled, or whether the particular musical materials that were 
used were of a pivotal importance to O’Sullivan’s composition as a whole, or whether a 
reasonable listener familiar with O’Sullivan’s work would be able to identify it readily in 
Biz’s version. Rather, the very fact that a copyright was placed on O’Sullivan’s work, 
and something was borrowed without his explicit consent, was at issue. Accordingly, the 
sampling of presumably any amount of previously copyrighted material at all without 
prior consent was, in the opinion of the Court, tantamount to copyright infringement. 
However, a rather tantalizing complication surrounding the release of Gilbert 
O’Sullivan’s work must be addressed insofar as it raises the question as to which of the 
various statutory copyright mechanisms could be involved in a determination of 
infringement.  
Title 17 of the United States Code entails a codified version of the Copyright Act 
of 1976. Section 102 provides that both “musical works, including any accompanying 
works” and “sound recordings” are protected by copyright by virtue of this Congressional 
enactment. “Phonorecords” are those objects in which the sounds of a musical 
                                                          
4
 “The Grand Upright decision completely bypassed [various applicable tests for determining 
infringement] thus providing little guidance to ascertain the quantitative and qualitative threshold 
level for future sampling cases.” 
Stephen R. Wilson, “Music Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De 
Minimis Defense?” Journal of High Technology Law 1 (2002): 188. 
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composition are “fixed,” warranting copyright protection for both. For the purpose of 
presenting an adequate definition, the relevant explanatory passages will be quoted here. 
Phonorecords are material objects in which sounds, other than those 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any 
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device. The term “phonorecords” includes the material object in 
which the sounds are first fixed.
5
 
 
The operative word, “fixed,” is defined as follows. 
 
A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a 
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of 
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this 
title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
6
 
 
As clarified by Ronald Mark Wells, recordings that were released on or after 
February 15, 1972 were to be covered under the Sound Recordings Act of 1971, which 
was eventually codified into the Copyright Act of 1976 and Title 17.
7
 The rather curious 
circumstance attending the release of O’Sullivan’s recording is as follows: according to 
his website, it was released in February of 1972.
8
 Employing a hypothetical application 
of American copyright law to a recording released in Europe, Biz Markie’s actions could 
pose a justiciable matter for an American court, as it obviously did, on one or two 
grounds (perhaps both.) First, if O’Sullivan’s recording was released prior to February 
                                                          
5
 “Copyrights,” at p. 1032. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Wells 1988-1989: 696-697.  
8
 “Song Index,” The Official Gilbert O’Sullivan Website: A Friend of Mine, 
http://www.gilbertosullivan.net/songs/list5.htm, (Accessed November 7, 2013).  
An exact date is not specified, and inquiries that I have posed to his current agent as to the exact 
date of its release have been unanswered. Obviously, O’Sullivan’s recording was either released 
before February 15, 1972, or on or after that date. 
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15, 1972, then it may still have been protected insofar as Biz’s infringement of the 
musical composition would have been unlawful under the Copyright Act of 1909 which 
prohibits such infringement, since, in this scenario, the recording itself would not have 
been protected under the Sound Recordings Act of 1971. Of course, the proposition that 
American copyright statutes could punish an American artist’s infringement on the 
copyright placed on a musical composition of an artist from outside of the United States 
might appear problematic. Nevertheless, the Copyright Act of 1909, under which the 
composition itself may, in this hypothetical scenario, have been protected, and/or under 
which Biz’s actions were justiciable, provides, in pertinent part, that 
the copyright secured by this Act shall extend to the work of an author or 
proprietor who is a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation, only…(b) when 
the foreign state or nation of which such author or proprietor is a citizen or subject 
grants, either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United 
States the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as to its own 
citizens…or when such foreign state or nation is a party to an international 
agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the 
terms of which agreement the United States may, at its pleasure, become a party 
thereto.
9
  
 
But which entity did Judge Duffy refer to? Was it the composition, or the 
recording of the composition? As we observed in the Bridgeport decision discussed 
earlier, a Court can consider infringements of the copyright placed on the sound 
recording of a musical composition irrespective of the composition itself for, among 
other reasons, the reason that determination of the infringement of the composition itself 
is a more difficult process than that with respect to recordings, as the former requires the 
                                                          
9
 Emphasis added. “Amend and Consolidate,” at p. 1077. 
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application of various tests such as de minimis
10
 and substantial similarity analysis that 
the same consideration of sound recordings does not. While the judge does make 
reference to the infringements on the “song” and “composition,” and since Biz Markie 
had sampled directly from O’Sullivan’s recording as well, thereby involving the 
recording itself, wouldn’t some kind of consideration of potential infringement of the 
copyright placed on the sound recording be warranted? 
It appears that Judge Duffy does shed light on this matter. It might be argued that 
the following passage indicates that the infringements on the copyrights of both are being 
considered. 
This proceeding was instituted by [an] Order to Show Cause to obtain a 
preliminary injunction against the defendants [primarily Biz Markie] for the 
improper and unlicensed use of a composition “Alone Again (Naturally)” written 
and performed on records by Raymond “Gilbert” O’Sullivan. Defendants admit 
“that the Biz Markie album ‘I Need a Haircut’ embodies the rap recording ‘Alone 
Again’ which uses three words from ‘Alone Again (Naturally)’ composed by 
Gilbert O’Sullivan and a portion of the music taken from the O’Sullivan 
recording.” [The statement in quotation marks comes from the Defendants’ Post-
Hearing Memorandum at line 2, as cited in the judge’s decision.] The only issue, 
therefore, seems to be who owns the copyright to the song “Alone Again 
(Naturally)” and the master recording thereof made by Gilbert O’Sullivan. 
[Various] categories of proof lead me to the conclusion that the plaintiff 
[O’Sullivan] is the true owner of these copyrights.11 
Two statutory provisions from the United States Code, relative to the ability of the 
Defendants to face criminal prosecution for their actions,
12
 were cited in the decision. 
                                                          
10
 In applying this test, a court must consider whether the copying “occurred to such a trivial 
extent as to fall below the quantitative threshold of substantial similarity.” 
Ringgold v Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F. 3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) 
11
 Emphasis added, Grand Upright at page 183. 
12
 Recall my observation above that no such statutes that actually explained which of the two 
possible entities at issue were to be considered were cited that might have substantiated his 
assertion in the passage above to the effect that copyrights for both the song and the recording 
were at issue. 
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One, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2319, provides the penalties for “criminal infringement of a 
copyright.” The other, 17 U.S.C. section 506(a), provides a definition of “criminal 
infringement,” which includes “the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic 
means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more 
copyrighted works,” the latter being defined as “a computer program, a musical work, a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, or a sound recording.”13 
Thus, under the copyright statute that actually was referenced by Judge Duffy, 
infringements of copyrights on musical compositions as well as on their sound recordings 
are legally problematic, and the relevant passage from his decision, cited above, indicates 
that he may have been considering infringement on both. To refer to Bridgeport yet 
again, the determination of an infringement on a musical composition is not as simple as 
that for a recording. And it is in this regard, and in the terse manner in which Judge Duffy 
found an infringement of an ultimately indefinite item or items,
14
 that his decision in 
Grand Upright has been criticized for the following reasons. 
First, Judge Duffy was rightly concerned over the infringement of the 
copyright(s), whether in the form of that which covered the musical composition by 
O’Sullivan, or the sound recording that contains it. However, insofar as his deliberations 
included matters relating to the former, his decision was hasty and inadequately justified 
                                                          
13
 Emphasis added, 17 U.S.C. 506(a) (1976) 
14
 I refer to the judge’s designation, in the passage above, as “indefinitive” insofar as no statutes 
that may have substantiated his inclusion of both entities were cited. It must be reiterated that the 
only copyright statute cited in the ruling was the one pertaining to penalties for “criminal 
infringement of a copyright” on items that include both musical works and sound recordings. For 
the foregoing reason of the lack of corroborating statutory citations, I deem it appropriate to refer 
to the matter of which entity was appealed to as “ultimately indefinite.” 
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or substantiated. This is because, while once again conceding the importance of an 
ideally inviolate copyright protection on sound recordings, the recordings would not exist 
were it not for the compositions that are on them in the first place. Therefore, 
consideration of copyright infringement on compositions, described as inherently more 
difficult and uncertain, is necessary, too. As Ronald Thomas lamented,  
the court did not attempt to analyze digital sampling with regard to any possible 
allowable uses [of the musical material] or defense; in the court’s view digital 
sampling was clearly considered theft. […] The discussion of the opinion was 
devoid of any application of copyright law to the practice of digital sampling.
15
 
Theft was assumed. Therefore, no boundaries were drawn which [could] allow for 
flexibility between the copyright holders of samples songs and the sampling 
musicians.
16
 
The inherent difficulty and uncertainty of determining infringements of the 
compositions themselves is further explained by A. Dean Johnson.  
While a sample may infringe upon the sound recording by appropriating a small 
or distinctive part of the recording, it may not infringe upon the underlying 
musical work as the portion sampled may qualify as de minimis. […] Although 
some believe that sampling even one note or chord of someone’s trademark sound 
constitutes infringement, no infringement occurs in this situation under present 
copyright law. […] Accordingly, unless a plaintiff can prove that the defendant 
has sampled a copyrightable portion of either the underlying composition or the 
sound recording, the court may not find the defendant liable for copyright 
infringement.
17
 
Johnson provides a long list of “other factors in the analysis [of infringement] that 
are available” and by which “judicial discretion can play a significant role in [such] cases 
if [they] choose to consider various factors that are better suited for an 
                                                          
15
 Except, possibly, for the application of the statute from Title 17, which pertains to the penalties 
for copyright infringement in the concluding paragraph of the decision. 
16
 Ronald W. Thomas Jr., “Digital Sampling in the Music Industry: Evolution in an Unfriendly 
Legal Environment,” Loyola Intellectual Property and High Technology Law Quarterly 2 (1997): 
20. 
17
 Emphasis added. A. Dean Johnson, “Music Copyrights: The Need for an Appropriate Fair Use 
Analysis in Digital Sampling Infringement Suits,” Florida State University Law Review 21 
(1993-1994): 141-142. 
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accurate…determination,” particularly as they relate to the underlying musical 
composition.
18
 These factors include: whether the sampling has been performed for 
commercial or non-profit use,
19
 whether any appreciable degree of “transformation” of 
the original material has been performed,
20
 “the amount and sustainability of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,”21 considerations of the quantity and 
quality of the material used,
22
 “the effect of the use [of that material] upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work,”23 “the frequency with which the sample is 
used in the allegedly infringing work,”24 and even “attempts by the user to negotiate a 
license with the sampled artist for the use of a sample.”25 Two other methods for making 
such determinations, which clearly were not employed by the court in Grand Upright, 
include the reception of the Biz Markie work (and whether it is reasonable to propose that 
the average listener would recognize O’Sullivan’s work within it,) and the inclusion of 
“expert testimony” that would postulate some kind of empirical method for determining 
if the sampled material was of a character, be it in terms of length, frequency of 
appearance, or significance to the composition overall, that a designation of copyright 
infringement was appropriate. As for the first, Austin Padgett
26
 makes reference to 
Harold Lloyd Corp v. Witwer, a case heard by the Ninth Circuit in 1933, in which such an 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., 144. 
19
 Ibid., 144. 
20
 Ibid., 147. 
21
 Ibid., 151. 
22
 Ibid., 153. 
23
 Ibid., 154. 
24
 Ibid., 157. 
25
 Ibid., 160. 
26
 Austin Padgett, “The Rhetoric of Predictability: Reclaiming the Lay Ear in Music Copyright 
Infringement Litigation,” Franklin Pierce Law Review 7 (2008): 128. 
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“audience test” was proposed. As the Court observed with respect to a dramatic play, but 
which can be applied to musical works as well, 
the question really involved in such comparison is to ascertain the effect of the 
alleged infringing play upon the public, that is, upon the average reasonable man. 
If an ordinary person [is acquainted with the original work]…he should detect that 
fact without any aid or suggestion or critical analysis by others.
27
 
Second, the expert testimony that musicologists are uniquely qualified to deliver 
can be used to more empirically, and therefore more tenably and defensibly, determine 
matters of copyright infringements on musical works. Some scholars, such as Padgett, 
have expressed concern over the “fear” of “trusting a jury with such an ‘ineffable’ subject 
as music.”28 This is because of the need to “[include] expert testimony, [create] 
specialized courts, or [engage in] mechanical analysis” to facilitate the conception and 
application of infringement tests that are arguably more substantive and rigorous than the 
response of an average listener.
29
 However, others are less concerned and have expressly 
supported the need for experts—for our purposes, musicologists—in copyright 
infringement cases. This is because of their vast knowledge of the stylistic conventions of 
music, the history of recording technology, and their rigorously explicable understanding 
of the concept of context in music as it relates to the significance of certain features or 
sections of a composition relative to others and which is informed by an extensive study 
of musical form. Miah Rosenberg points out that unlike the products of other artistic 
media, “music is not so easily compartmentalized. […] Consequently, courts might 
choose to analyze [musical] works without a set formula. The type of work at issue thus 
                                                          
27
 Harold Lloyd Corp. v Witwer, 65 F. 2d 1, 18 (9
th
 Cir. 1933). 
28
 Padgett, “The Rhetoric of Predictability,” 125. 
29
 Ibid., 125. 
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helps dictate the type of analysis the court will employ for [such a] test.”30 And, as M. 
Fletcher Reynolds has pointed out, the inclusion of expert testimony in these kinds of 
infringement cases, given the inherent conceptual complexities as far as the musical 
compositions themselves are concerned, can not only be quite important in itself, but also 
in terms of how future adjudication can be better performed. 
Although a judge is usually a layman in the expert’s field, he often knows 
something about the expert’s methodology. […] In music plagiarism cases, 
however, even an otherwise well-educated judge usually has little understanding 
of what music theorists do, and he will find no legal authority to steer his 
evidentiary decisions in the right direction. Quite the contrary, the sparse legal 
writings on music are filled with truly astonishing misinformation.
31
 
Such expert testimony can indeed improve the findings of courts in terms of 
musical infringement suits by providing a crucial focus on the contextual situation of the 
material being sampled, how it is being sampled, how or if any substantial changes are 
made to the original material in the sampling process, etc. that would not be present in a 
“dead letter” application of the rules of adjudicating such matters. David S. Blessing, for 
instance, is right to point out that as it relates to de minimis considerations, for example,  
a completely quantitative definition…may suggest that whenever there is a 
sampling of more than five musical notes, it constitutes copyright infringement. 
This approach would completely [ignore] the significance of the originality in the 
samples, the use in the earlier work, the use in the later work, and many other 
qualitative factors. Courts…have consistently looked at these qualitative factors 
to determine whether the use is de minimis.
32
 
                                                          
30
 Miah Rosenberg, “Do You Hear What I Hear? Expert Testimony in Music Infringement Cases 
in the Ninth Circuit,” U.C. Davis Law Review 39 (2005-2006): 1675. 
 
31
 Cited in Rosenberg, “Do You Hear What I Hear?,” 1685. 
32
 Emphasis added. David S. Blessing, “Who Speaks Latin Anymore? Translating De Minimis 
Use for Application to Music Copyright Infringement and Sampling,” William and Mary Law 
Review Volume 45 (2004): 2408. 
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Neither these factors nor the expert testimony that would corroborate their 
usefulness were considered by Judge Duffy. Arguably, they should have been at least 
acknowledged. Since something like a satirical, transformative, or other generally 
creative purpose could have been attributed to or discerned in Biz’s actions, these 
possibilities might have been entertained some stage in the litigation. Musicologists have 
repeatedly asserted the validity of such intentions as they relate to sampling, or copying 
of previously written musical material generally understood. For instance, as far back as 
1927, Hugh Arthur Scott proposed that such copying would be “inevitable” given that all 
future musical progress must “inevitably build upon the foundations provided by [our] 
predecessors”33 which, presumably being so ingrained within compositional procedure, 
can even occur by way of “unconscious cerebration”34 (such as was disregarded in Fred 
Fisher.) Constantin von Sternberg emphasized the need to assess “the difference between 
a master’s purposed alteration of his own theme and a dodged or disguised plagiarism 
[of it by himself or another.]”35 Subsequently, Charles Carroll identifies a manner of 
“socially acceptable” borrowing, defined as “a borrowing which constitutes a kind of 
implied honor, and [which] indeed in many cases has served to rescue the original 
composer or his work from later anonymity,” citing, among other examples, the 
composition by Benjamin Britten of variations on a theme by his teacher, Frank Bridge.
36
 
More recently and among other possibilities, J. Peter Burkholder mentions “allusion” and 
                                                          
33
 Hugh Arthur Scott, “Indebtedness in Music,” The Musical Quarterly 13 (October, 1927): 497. 
34
 Ibid., 499. 
35
 Emphasis original. Constantin von Sternberg, “On Plagiarism,” The Musical Quarterly 5 (July, 
1919): 391. 
36
 Charles Michael Carroll, “Musical Borrowing—Grand Larceny or Great Art?” College Music 
Symposium 18 (Spring, 1978): 13. 
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“collage” as two manners in which permissible or otherwise respectable copying could be 
performed, the former including “pay[ing] homage to its source, comment[ing] upon or 
suggest[ing] parallels to its source, exemplif[ying] competition between the composer of 
the new work and the composer of the existing work, [or] critiq[uing] or negat[ing] its 
source,”37 and the latter including “creat[ing] a stream of consciousness effect.”38
                                                          
37
 Robert Hatten would refer to such a practice as instigating a “dialogue or confrontation with the 
earlier work.” 
 
Robert Hatten, “The Place of Intertextuality in Music Studies,” The American Journal of 
Semiotics 3 (1985): 70. 
 
38
 J. Peter Burkholder, “The Uses of Existing Music: Musical Borrowing as a Field,” Notes: The 
Quarterly Journal of the Music Library Association 50 (March, 1994): 869. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 ADDITIONAL CRITIQUE OF THE GRAND UPRIGHT COURT’S 
DECISION THROUGH TESTS PREVIOUSLY AND SUBSEQUENTLY 
POSTULATED FOR DETERMINING MUSICAL INFRINGEMENT 
 
SECTION ONE 
 
In the preceding chapters, I have examined the history and development of copyright 
legislation in the United States particularly as it has been expanded to provide protection 
to musical compositions, the sound recordings that contain them, and the history of 
digital sampling technology. I also explored the circumstances of Grand Upright Music 
Limited v Warner Bros. Records, Inc including some of the conceptual shortcomings of 
the Court’s decision and the resulting criticism among experts of intellectual property and 
copyright law. In the first of the two sections of this chapter, I consider two tests that 
courts prior to Grand Upright have postulated as appropriate methods for determining if 
infringement, or what I have referred to in slightly different terms as impermissibly 
excessive borrowing (IEB), have occurred in a particular case. These tests are identified 
as de minimis and “substantial similarity” tests. Superficially, IEB is similar to 
“substantial similarity” and therefore is already implicated within matters of potential 
copyright infringement. However, insofar as a distinction exists between the definition 
that legal authorities have assigned to “substantial similarity” and that which I proffer as 
IEB, I begin this section by defining the relevant terms. I then emphasize the 
appropriateness and applicability of IEB with respect to a critique of the Grand Upright 
decision. (I therefore provide a definition of de minimis and “substantial similarity” as 
applied in previous cases.) I then re-consider the decision of the Grand Upright court 
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through the theoretical lens of “democratic experimentalism,” a principle of legal 
interpretation. I argue for its relevance for considering cases of potential copyright 
infringement wherein, as with the two tests previously mentioned, there are no precisely 
quantifiable criteria for determining infringement. Subsequently, I address various artistic 
purposes for which recording artists, including Biz Markie, could claim to be engaging in 
the sampling process and the implications that these purposes may have for the rules of 
intellectual property and copyright law under which they operate. I also argue that 
considering each one of these issues—the individual tests and even the individual artistic 
purposes—by themselves to the exclusion of others, is an inadequate method for 
assessing claims of musical copyright infringement, and, as explained in the conclusion, 
and in accordance with the experimentalist perspective, how they must be considered 
more or less concurrently and in a slightly modified fashion. 
Three terms must be defined in order to adequately understand how matters of 
potential infringement, be they of compositions or sound recordings that contain them (or 
for other media for that matter), are determined: infringement, de minimis and 
“substantial similarity.” 
The Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English Jurisprudence 
by Benjamin Vaughan Abbott from 1879 provides the following explanation of 
infringement of copyright.  
To show that one literary work may have been suggested by another, or that some 
parts or pages of it have resemblances, either in method, details, or illustrations, is 
not sufficient to establish infringement; the complainant must further show that 
such resemblances are so close, full, uniform, and striking, as to lead to the 
conclusion that the one is a substantial copy of the other, or mainly borrowed 
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from it. […] And the mere colorable variations intended to evade liability for 
infringement will not destroy the identity of the two books. If a material part of 
the copyrighted publication is used, the alleged piratical work, though it may be in 
some respects an improvement, is [still] an infringement.
1
 
 
Abbott goes on to state, in terms quite prescient of Judge Hand in Fred Fisher, 
that  
 
the question of the motive of [the] defendant has not much to do with the question 
of infringement, except in balanced cases. If a comparison of the two works 
indicates clearly that the defendant, in the preparation of his work, has in fact 
made use of the plaintiff’s to an extent unwarranted by law, the absence of an 
intent to violate the law will not relieve him from the consequences of his acts.
2
 
The inclusion of musical compositions within the purview of Abbott’s definition 
of copyright infringement is not evident within this particular entry—insofar as musical 
compositions are not explicitly addressed or included. Abbott refers to “books such as 
dictionaries, gazetteers, grammars, maps, arithmetics, almanacs, concordances, 
[en]cyclopedias, itineraries, guide-books, and similar publications,”3 the last of these not 
plausibly inclusive of musical compositions. (This is to say nothing of the sound 
recordings that contain them, given the year of this dictionary’s assembly and 
publications—1879.) However, since Abbott also makes clear that “the determination of 
the question of infringement varies somewhat with the nature of the work under 
consideration,”4 the implicit principle is that these definitions can be applied in the 
consideration of works and media theretofore unknown and only subsequently developed. 
Accordingly, it is instructive to examine the definitions of a later source to see if or how 
                                                          
1
 Benjamin Vaughan Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English 
Jurisprudence Vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1879): 606. 
2
 Ibid., 606-607. 
3
 Ibid., 606. 
4
 Ibid., 606. 
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the notion of infringement has changed, whether by expansion or by limitation of 
definition. 
The 2009 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, one of the most widely used and 
authoritative legal sources still in use, provides nearly two full pages that feature various 
permutations of the general concept of infringement, including “contributory, domain-
name, and trademark” infringements.5 This illustrates how the concept of infringement 
has developed over the intervening 130 years, in part, because of the expansion of 
technological means for artistic creation. Since the definition of the general concept is 
“an act that interferes with one of the exclusive rights of a patent, copyright, or trademark 
owner,” this definition, as well as the more refined definitions of the practice of 
infringing the above-mentioned and several other characteristics of a created product, 
indeed indicates the expansion in the manners of the manifestation of infringement to 
accommodate the advances in technology over the intervening period that allowed for 
different media of artistic and literary creation. 
The second term that must be defined is de minimis, which refers to one of the 
two tests mentioned above for determining infringements on musical compositions and/or 
sound recordings. The 1879 Dictionary provides the full Latin phrase, “de minimis non 
curat lex,” translated therein as “the law does not concern itself with trifles,” and, in the 
course of explaining the implications of this doctrine for the general practice of accepting 
and adjudicating various cases and complaints, makes clear its relevance to 
quantitative/quantifiable facets of potentially justiciable matters to be considered by a 
                                                          
5
 Black’s Law Dictionary, edited by Bryan A. Garner et al., (St. Paul, Minnesota: Thomson 
Reuters, 2009): 851-852 (Hereafter Black’s). 
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court which can include, as will be demonstrated below, the amount of musical material 
“sampled” or otherwise appropriated in cases of potential musical infringement. As the 
Dictionary says, 
as a general rule, the law does take cognizance of matters of small pecuniary 
value or trivial importance; and does not refuse to regard matters otherwise 
properly within its cognizance, merely because the question raised on the amount 
involved is of small consequence. […] For example, every felonious taking of 
property is criminal, whatever may be the value of the property. […] But as to 
mere technical defects, trifling irregularities, or omissions of established forms 
not affecting substantial rights, the maxim fully applies; and the courts do not take 
notice of trifling deviations in matters of practice.
6
   
As interpreted or construed in terms of a potential relation to the sheer quantity of 
material in any manner affected, such as tangible or intellectual property, and with 
particular reference to the phrase “trifling irregularities,” this definition indicates that 
there is an inadequately identified, but perhaps intuitively recognized, minimum 
threshold below which a court may deem it inappropriate or unnecessary to intervene. 
This is further clarified by the definition of this doctrine in the 2009 edition of Black’s 
under which a matter may be “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an 
issue or case.”7  
The third and final term that concerns us is “substantial similarity.” The term 
“similarity” does not appear in its own individual entry in the 1879 Dictionary, but 
“substantial,” as it relates to its parent term, “substance,” does. Yet another indication of 
the ability, and even necessity, of certain legal principles to be adapted to changing forms 
of literary and artistic creation comes in the form of Abbott’s admonition that “what is 
meant by the ‘substance,’ in a given connection, is a matter of construction varying with 
                                                          
6
 Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases, 345. 
7
 Black’s, 496. 
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the nature of the subject-matter. The decisions involving these words will be found to 
turn, not upon any peculiar significance of substance as a law term [in itself], but on the 
question, what is the substance of a given affair or transaction.”8  
The 2009 Black’s, however, both mentions and defines “substantial similarity.” 
As it relates to both copyright and intellectual property, it is defined as “a strong 
resemblance between a copyrighted work and an alleged infringement, thereby creating 
an inference of unauthorized copying.”9 Black’s then provides a concise explanation of 
the test to be executed in making such a determination. “The standard for substantial 
similarity is whether an ordinary person would conclude that the alleged infringement has 
appropriated nontrivial amounts of the copyrighted works’ expressions.”10 
Let us briefly consider a few prior cases in which both the de minimis and 
“substantial similarity” standards were employed before discussing how they could and 
perhaps should have been considered by the Grand Upright court. 
Beginning with cases involving de minimis considerations, Marks v Leo Feist, 
Inc. stands out as one in which the sheer quantity of the musical material appropriated, 
external to the potential significance it possessed for the original composition as a whole, 
was considered by that court. In this matter, Edward B. Marks brought suit against Leo 
Feist, Inc. for the latter’s supposed infringement on the copyright of the former’s 
“Wedding Dance Waltz” through the latter’s “Swanee River Moon,” which contained six 
measures of the former’s “Wedding Dance Waltz.” Significantly, “the composer of the 
                                                          
8
 Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases, 513. 
9
 Black’s, 1509. 
10
 Ibid., 1509. Emphasis added to differentiate this principle from de minimis.  
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‘Swanee River Moon’ [swore] he never knew of the composition entitled ‘Wedding 
Dance Waltz’ and never heard it played” until long after it was initially copyrighted. 
Finding against the plaintiff in this case, Judge Manton, apparently taking no heed of the 
potential significance of these six measures for the entire 450 measure composition, 
simply declared that  
to constitute an infringement of the appellant’s composition, it would be 
necessary to find a substantial copying of a substantial and material part of it. […] 
The exclusive right granted to the appellant by his copyright to print, reprint, 
publish, copy, and vend does not exclude the appellee from the use of 6 similar 
bars, when used in a composition of 450 bars.
11
 
A second and much more recent case entailed a similarly justified dismissal on 
grounds of de minimis, but this time in a case that was complicated by consideration of 
copyrights placed on both the musical composition and the recording that contained it as 
well as an appeal to the distinction between the musical composition at issue as written 
and the composition as recorded being used to find in favor of the defendant. In Newton 
v Diamond, a professional flautist, James Newton, sued the Beastie Boys for their alleged 
infringement of one of his compositions, entitled “Choir,” for their work, “Pass the Mic.” 
The latter contained a digital sample of six seconds of the former looped over forty 
consecutive times for the background of the latter. The pernicious distinction between the 
copyright placed on a musical composition and a separate one placed on a recording that 
contains it was central to this case insofar as Newton contended that while the Beastie 
Boys secured a license to sample from the recording company, no such license was 
secured for the use of the actual composition. As the Bridgeport court would hold in 
2004, the Newton court held only that a license was needed for the use of the recording 
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 Marks v Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (1923). 
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itself since the composition as written was significantly different from the composition as 
recorded, insofar as the former did not contains various performance techniques that 
were executed for the latter.
12
 Judge Manella, writing for the Court, explained not only 
this distinction per se, but also how it necessarily implicates what features of the 
composition are being appealed to for Newton’s purported right to initiate an 
infringement action with respect to the composition. 
Plaintiff [Newton] argues that analytic dissection is not required, because 
copyright law automatically protects copyrightable expression reduced to a 
musical score or phonorecord. Plaintiff’s argument begs the question as to what is 
protected by his copyright over the musical composition, as opposed to ECM’s 
[the record company] copyright over the sound recording. […] [The] Court must 
first determine precisely what is protected by Plaintiff’s copyright over his 
musical composition.
13
  
Blessing’s summary is substantiated by a lengthier explanation from the Court. 
Judge Manella provides this in a subsection entitled “The Sample of Plaintiff’s Musical 
Composition is Unprotectable.”14 
The protectability of elements of a copyrighted work is a question of law for the 
court. […] Although the musical composition of Choir is protected as a complete 
work, not every element of a song is per se protected. […] Copyright protection 
extends only to those components of the work that are original and non-trivial. 
                                                          
12
 Blessing, “Who Speaks Latin Anymore?,” 2399-2400. 
In addition, the commentary of Eric Leventhal on this ontological distinction and its application 
to Bridgeport in particular would be helpful here: “Perhaps the most obvious reason why music is 
worthy of different treatment [in copyright litigation] is implicitly codified in the statute via the 
inclusion of two separate types of works in the form of sound recordings and musical 
compositions. These two works are treated as entirely separate in the United States Copyright Act 
and often, as Bridgeport demonstrated, in the judiciary. This separation belies a complexity that 
sets the musical copyrights apart from the other copyrightable forms of art…[and] demonstrates 
why music’s statutory formulation exists in its present dichotomy and why it necessitates, by 
virtue of its complexity, different treatment in the judiciary.” Eric Leventhal, “Would You Want 
William Hung as Your Trier of Fact? The Case for a Specialized Musicology Tribunal,” Texas 
Law Review 90 (2012): 1570-1571. 
13
 Emphasis added. Newton v Diamond, 204 F. Supp 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal 2002) (hereinafter 
Newton). 
14
 Emphasis added. Ibid., at page 1252.  
  
 
 
 
50 
[…] In the instant case, Plaintiff’s three-note sequence (C—D-flat—C) with one 
background note (C), segregated from the entire piece, cannot be protected, as it is 
not original as a matter of law. Many courts have found that nearly identical or 
more substantial samples are not susceptible to copyright protection.
15
 
The Court accordingly found that the sampling was a de minimis question.  
Defendants appropriate a six-second sample consisting of a three-note sequence 
from a musical composition that takes approximately four and half minutes to 
play. […] Quantitatively, this sample is thus approximately 2% of the piece. […] 
Moreover, Plaintiff identifies no factors—separate and apart from those 
attributable to the unique performance techniques—that would render the three-
note sequence qualitatively important to Plaintiff’s entire composition of Choir.16  
Cases such as this illustrate the conceptual complexities attendant to such 
disputes, as they necessarily require considering both the musical compositions and the 
sound recordings that contain them as ontologically and functionally distinct yet 
interdependent entities. 
Returning to the question of musical copyright infringement involving tests of 
“substantial similarity,” Ronald Thomas explains that substantial similarity tests can 
include either a de minimis, or purely quantitative approach, or a “quantitative/qualitative 
analysis.”17 (Hence my previous distinction between de minimis and “substantial 
similarity.” Here a second option under the general heading of substantial similarity is 
available.) One such particularly tantalizing case was Seth Swirsky v Mariah Carey from 
2004. 
This action was brought by Seth Swirsky against Mariah Carey for her alleged 
infringement of the former’s composition entitled “One of Those Love Songs” in her 
work “Thank God I Found You.” This case is particularly noteworthy for its inclusion of 
the expert testimony of a distinguished musicologist, Robert Walser, then at the 
                                                          
15
 Emphasis added. Ibid., at page 1253. 
16
 Emphasis added. Ibid., at page 1258. 
17
 Thomas Jr., “Digital Sampling in the Music Industry,” 19. 
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University of California at Los Angeles. The Ninth Circuit, which presided over this case, 
employed a “substantial similarity” test informed by Walser’s expert testimony. 
Curiously, the Court imposed an “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” test to determine whether 
Carey’s work was substantially similar to Swirsky’s. While the “intrinsic test” was 
deemed unnecessary for summary judgment, it is nonetheless defined by the Court as “[a] 
subjective question whether works are intrinsically similar [that] must be left to the 
jury.”18 However, the  
‘extrinsic test’ considers whether two works share a similarity of ideas and 
expression as measured by external, objective criteria. […] The extrinsic test 
requires ‘analytical dissection of a work and expert testimony.’19 […] ‘Analytical 
dissection’ requires breaking the works ‘down into their constituent elements, and 
comparing those elements for proof of copying as measured by ‘substantial 
similarity.’20  
Writing for the Court, Judge Canby described Walser’s comparisons of the two 
works at issue and the resulting conclusions as follows. 
Dr. Walser admitted that the lyrics and verse melodies of the two songs differed 
‘clearly and significantly,’ but stated that the two songs’ choruses shared a ‘basic 
shape and pitch emphasis’ in their melodies which were played over ‘highly 
similar basslines and chord changes[.]’ […] Dr. Walser also noted that it was a 
‘suspicious coincidence’ that that two songs’ choruses were both sung in B-flat. 
Dr. Walser further testified that the choruses in both [these works] shared a 
similar structure in that measures five through seven of each chorus were ‘almost 
exactly’ the same as the first three measures of each chorus. […] 
[Notwithstanding some significant distinctions], Dr. Walser ultimately 
concluded…that these differences were not enough to differentiate the songs 
because the overall emphasis on musical notes was the same, which ‘contribute[d] 
to the impression of similarity one hears when comparing the two songs.’21 
The actions of the Ninth Circuit in reversing key facets of the lower district 
court’s handling of this matter are quite instructive in terms of their justifications. It is 
                                                          
18
 Seth Swirsky v Mariah Carey, 376 F. 3d 841, 845 (9
th
 Cir. 2004) (hereinafter Seth Swirsky). 
19
 As cited from a previous case. 
20
 Seth Swirsky, at page 845. 
21
 Emphasis added, Ibid., at page 845-846. Internal quotations are from Walser. 
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clear that the Ninth Circuit considered this evaluation as more complicated than terms 
such as “extrinsic” and “objective” might indicate. For instance, the lower district court 
had apparently compared the two works by performing a “measure-by-measure 
comparison of [the] melodic note sequences from the full transcriptions of the 
choruses.”22 This might seem to be the epitome of an empirical, objective comparison of 
the two works, eminently appropriate for determining matters of potential musical 
copyright infringement. The Court, however, expanded the parameters of what could 
accurately be considered under this objective, extrinsic test in a way that lead Miah 
Rosenberg to accuse the Court of not actually implementing such a test insofar as 
“subjective” opinions of Walser as to the musical items to be compared and/or deemed 
significant for potential infringement were considered.
23
 The Court explained that  
objective analysis of music under the extrinsic test cannot mean that a court may 
simply compare the numerical representations of pitch sequences and the visual 
representation of notes to determine that two choruses are not substantially 
similar, without regard to other elements of the composition. […] No approach 
can completely divorce pitch sequences and rhythm from harmonic chord 
progression, tempo, and key, and thereby support a conclusion that compositions 
are dissimilar as a matter of law.
24
 
The Court ultimately found that the “substantial similarity” standard was met. The 
fact that the Ninth Circuit had overturned the lower court’s discounting of Walser’s 
expert testimony clearly indicates the vital role that musicologists can play, given their 
unique expertise, in musical infringement cases. The Court expressly endorsed the 
necessity of expert musicological assistance in such issues by stating that  
                                                          
22
 Ibid., at page 847.  
23
 Rosenberg, “Do You Hear What I Hear?,” 1690. 
24
 Emphasis added, Seth Swirsky, at page 847-848. 
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in analyzing musical compositions under the [applicable] test[s], we have never 
announced a uniform set of factors to be used. […] There is no one magical 
combination of factors that will automatically substantiate a musical infringement 
suit; each allegation of infringement will be unique. So long as the plaintiff can 
demonstrate, through expert testimony that addresses some or all of these 
elements and supports its employment of them, that the similarity was 
‘substantial’ and to ‘protected elements’ of the copyrighted works, the 
[applicable] test is satisfied.
25
 
Opinions such as this demonstrate the benefits that expert testimony by 
musicologists can provide for musical copyright infringement litigation. Furthermore, it 
attests to the pragmatic necessity of considering the unique circumstances of each 
individual instance of digital sampling to determine if, how, and to what extent various 
statutory copyright protections were violated. Finally, it recognizes, even if only by 
implication, that quantitative and qualitative characteristics of both the original 
composition and the new one contained in a new recording are not the only factors that 
can or even should be considered in copyright infringement cases. Others may be just as 
relevant to the inquiry. They shall be considered in the second section of this chapter. 
SECTION TWO 
 
THE NEED TO CONSIDER BOTH QUANTITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF 
SAMPLED MATERIAL TOGETHER AS WELL AS ARTISTIC PURPOSES 
PROFERRED FOR ITS USE, AND THE ROLE THAT “DEMOCRATIC 
EXPERIMENTALISM” CAN PLAY IN FACILITATING THIS 
 
My formulation of “impermissibly excessive borrowing” differs from “substantial 
similarity,” particularly as defined in Black’s in ways that render it particularly 
appropriate for a reconsideration of Grand Upright and other sampling cases. The 
definition of “substantial similarity” as found in Black’s is helpful, but is ultimately 
incomplete. In the first portion of the definition quoted above, the actual quantity of the 
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 Emphasis added, Ibid., at page 849. 
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material that is appropriated is not mentioned. While the material being used can be very 
significant, the sheer quantity itself could at the same time be so miniscule as to be 
“trivial” and, therefore, perhaps not an amount that the second portion of the definition 
indicates is constitutive of substantial similarity. Accordingly, questions of IEB which 
entail quantity as well as significance and are not considered in either Newton or Swirsky, 
should jointly and severally be considered.
26
 In addition, the various artistic purposes for 
which the sampling is being undertaken should also be weighed, particularly in light of 
the broad range of such ends that could grant artistic “cover” to the sampling process. A 
relaxation of penalization—even if not outright immunity—towards those who are doing 
the sampling might result under such circumstances.
27
 
The need to consider both of these factors together in matters of potential musical 
copyright infringement is motivated and even endorsed by a conceptual framework 
known in legal scholarship as “democratic experimentalism.” The literature on 
“democratic experimentalism” has grown considerably over the past fifteen years, the 
apparent “cornerstone-laying ceremony” for the public promulgation of this method 
                                                          
26
 Notice Justice Story’s admonition in the 1841 case of Folsom v Marsh that “the nature and 
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in 
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the 
original work” should be considered. -Emphasis added. Folsom v Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841), as cited in Johnson 1993-1994: 143. 
27
 These would include “borrowing, selfborrowing, transformative imitation, quotation, allusion, 
homage, modeling, emulation, recompositions, influence, paraphrase and indebtedness.” 
Attributed to Howard Mayer Brown and cited in Wellett Potter and Heather A. Forrest, 
“Musicological and legal perspectives on music borrowing: Past, present and future,” Australian 
Intellectual Property Journal 22 (2011): 139. 
Implied within such options is the consideration of, among other factors, the degree to which the 
musical material being sampled was altered, the significance of the sampled material not only for 
the original composition from which it was extracted but also for the new one, and whether the 
sampling is occurring in a new composition for some kind of critical or satirical purpose. 
Burkholder, “The Uses of Existing Music,” 868-869.  
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coming in the form of the publication of a monograph-length article entitled “A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism” by Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel.28 
While this document is eminently useful for its exhaustive presentation of this method, 
the conditions antecedent to its development (which rendered it necessary), and its 
application to various social, governmental, and juridical issues, I deem it more 
appropriate and less complicated to promote the use of “democratic experimentalism” in 
cases of digital sampling as expounded in Sabel’s subsequent article, “Dewey, 
Democracy and Democratic Experimentalism.”29 In this article, Sabel credits “democratic 
experimentalism” as facilitating “that form of self-government which, under ever new 
circumstances, affords the greatest possible scope to the social intelligence of problem 
solving and the flourishing of individual character as its condition and product,” as well 
as the means “either to act in conformity to a rule, or to provide a compelling account (as 
gauged by the experience of peers in similar situations) of why it is reasonable to deviate 
from the prescribed practice locally and perhaps more generally” in the course of 
deliberations on particular legal matters.
30
  
Since “substantial similarity” and de minimis are principles that do not entail an 
exact, or even somewhat empirically calculable, formulation for their application to 
digital sampling cases, what interests me here is the possibility of a more cogent method 
and more broadly applicable criteria by which instances of infringement or IEB could be 
                                                          
28
 Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,” 
Columbia Law Review 98 (March 1998): 267-473. (This is the pagination of the entire article.) 
29
 Charles Sabel, “Dewey, Democracy, and Democratic Experimentalism,” Contemporary 
Pragmatism 9 (December, 2012). 
30
 Emphasis added. Ibid., 37. 
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assessed. This would imply the determination of the incident “boundary of 
permissibility,” traversal beyond which a judge could reasonably conclude is constitutive 
of infringement or impermissibly excessive borrowing. If it is the case that 
“experimentalist arrangements are found in…areas of environmental protection…[,] 
regulation of telecommunications, energy, drug authorization, occupational health and 
safety, food, maritime, and rail safety, data privacy, employment promotion, social 
inclusion[,]…pension reform, and more recently in health care, anti-discrimination 
policy, and competition policy,”31 then I cannot discern any intrinsic methodological or 
ethical barrier to its use in the legal and musicological investigations of musical 
recordings and the attendant claims of infringement or impermissibly excessive 
borrowing—especially in cases where no criteria have been explicitly set forth by a 
particular court. (I can even safely justify its use on the grounds of its at least vague 
relevance to the “regulation of telecommunications.”) In addition, since Justin London 
has observed that contemporary musicology incorporates the methods and concerns of 
“reception history, feminist theory and gender studies, Marxist theory, post-colonial 
theory, and other forms of textual criticism,”32 there does not seem to be any inherent 
barrier to employing the methods and concerns of legal studies, yet another disciplinary 
framework. Even more to the point, the incorporation of the expert advice and testimony 
that musicologists are uniquely capable of providing in such matters would be essential to 
the overall empirical method of determining instances of infringement. “[P]rofessionals 
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 Ibid, 46-47. 
32
 Justin London, “Musicology,” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music, edited 
by Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (New York: Routledge, 2011), 497. 
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who understand the larger body of recorded popular music are better able to view songs 
objectively and may therefore be less susceptible to the subjective whims of humanity’s 
emotional connection or lack thereof,” thus avoiding the “subjectivity [which] plagues 
the infringement analysis and leads to undesirable verdicts, diminished creativity, and 
unnecessary licensing brought on by fear of litigation.”33  
The use of a “democratic experimentalist” perspective, as generally construed 
above, will require the establishment of a more cogent method and more broadly 
applicable criteria for determining whether instances of infringement or impermissibly 
excessive borrowing have occurred. The criteria will include those that were mentioned 
above: the quantity of the material sampled, the qualitative significance of the material 
sampled to the original composition as well as to the new one, and various artistic 
purposes for which the sampling was executed. The use of this method, and the criteria 
developed under it, will provide a supplement to the opinion of Judge Kevin Thomas 
Duffy, in the case of Grand Upright Music Limited v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc., in 
which Judge Duffy basically determined that impermissible “sampling” in a musical 
recording of Biz Markie had occurred by virtue of the fact that some kind of borrowing, 
no matter how small, had occurred on Biz Markie’s recording. Such supplementation is 
necessary in light of the practical shortcomings in applying only one of these tests, as 
some of the cases mentioned above, including Grand Upright, have done. As Carl 
Falstrom has commented, “the decision rendered all unauthorized sampling legally 
suspect; no distinction seemingly could be made between small bites and large cuts, 
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between instantly recognizable ‘trademarks’ and impossibly obscure and mundane 
banalities.”34 It is my hope that through such an experimentalist perspective, courts will 
expand their entertainment of musicological considerations, ideally through the expertise 
of musicologists themselves, for the determination of infringements—even if they may 
initially appear as “analytic dissection[s]”35 which a judge may not feel he or she is 
especially qualified to perform. As Potter and Forrest have argued,  
inviting the expertise of musicologists into copyright law helps to tailor what is 
otherwise a rather generally articulated statute…and to take into consideration the 
special characteristics of music. Just as genetic biologists and chemists may assist 
a court in determining a case of patent infringement, expert testimony of 
musicologists has a place in determinations of copyright infringement.
36
 
 
We begin with considering the sampling in Grand Upright as it relates to 
potential infraction of the standard of “substantial similarity.” Given Judge Duffy’s rather 
hasty and dispositive opinion, it may appear that the material used was so substantially 
similar as to immediately warrant a finding of this offense. Indeed, the material that Biz 
Markie had sampled was directly from, and therefore identical to, the material on Gilbert 
O’Sullivan’s original recording. However, as the cases mentioned below will illustrate, 
the discernment of previously composed material, and thus of an instance of substantial 
similarity, is not as easy as one may think from the terms of a written decision.  
 The circumstances of Grand Upright are such that it would be reasonable for one 
to assume that, if presented to a jury, they would immediately conclude that Biz Markie’s 
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 Carl A. Falstrom, “Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. V. Warner Bros. Records, 
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work was sufficiently similar to the original by O’Sullivan to warrant a judgment of 
copyright infringement. This is because upon hearing and comparing both O’Sullivan’s 
original and Biz Markie’s subsequent composition, the presence of the pivotal material of 
the former within the latter, particularly with the frequency of its use and the 
indispensable contextual significance it affords, would be so obvious that it might be 
difficult to argue otherwise. Determining copyright infringement by virtue of substantial 
similarity between musical compositions has sometimes been accomplished with 
remarkable facility. For instance, the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Hein et al. v. 
Harris occupied less than two full pages in the Federal Reporter and clearly indicated the 
ease of deciding that matter under its rather unproblematic circumstances. 
I have no difficulty in finding that the defendant’s song is an infringement of the 
complainant’s. […] [O]ut of a total of 17 bars, the first 13 are substantially the 
same in each song; and whether or not the defendant, as he alleges, had never 
heard the complainant’s song, when he wrote his [song]…[it] is certainly an 
infringement, and the complainant under his copyright is entitled to protection.
37
 
Jeffrey Sherman would later remark that the circumstances of this particular case 
were so simple and clear that no empirical method of determining substantial similarity 
was necessary. “The two songs [at issue] sound so much alike, even to the untrained ear, 
that it is difficult to understand why it was felt necessary [by Judge Hand] to resort 
to…pseudo-scientific devices to determine that there was substantial similarity.”38 
However, not all cases are as clear-cut as Hein et al. v. Harris—perhaps not even Grand 
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Upright despite Judge Duffy’s minimally engaged opinion.39) The primary reason for this 
does not stem so much from disagreement as to the degree of similarity between 
compositions so much as it relies on the necessary antecedent to such a consideration: 
arriving at an understanding of “substantial similarity” in the first place to be used which 
has been frustrated by the differences among courts as to the constituent elements of such 
a test. For instance, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
in Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records presented a jury instruction which 
entailed a rather nebulous concept to be considered in determining substantial similarity. 
Two works are substantially similar if the expression of ideas in the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work and the expression of ideas in the defendant’s work that are 
shared are substantially similar. The test for expression of ideas is whether the 
intended audience would find the total concept and feel of the two songs to be 
substantially similar.
40
 
The principle of the “total concept and feel,” in light of its inadequate 
qualification by the trial court, was accordingly subsequently deemed impermissible and 
rejected. This was by no means the first instance of a superior court overruling an ill-
defined concept of infringement in jury instructions. In Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas 
Nelson, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held to a very similarly worded principle from the jury 
instruction of a lower court to be contextually vague and inappropriate. “The highly 
subjective ‘total impact and feel’ test of Instruction No. 9 was insufficient, particularly in 
                                                          
39
As Eric Leventhal has observed, “any test for musical infringement that analyzes potentially 
illicit activity solely based on a lay, subjective understanding of music is inherently problematic.” 
Leventhal, “William Hung,” 1558-1559. 
40
 Emphasis added. Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records 394 F. 3d 357, 373 (5
th
 Cir. 
2004) This was the jury instruction given by the lower court. 
  
 
 
 
61 
light of the district court’s refusal to give the Defendants’ proposed instructions regarding 
unprotectable elements.”41 
Additional complications associated with determining substantial similarity stem 
from that circumstance which naturally dovetails with the often nebulous definitions 
afforded to the criteria for substantial similarity: the insufficient familiarity with the 
mechanics of music frequently possessed by jurors. As Jamie Lund, professor of 
intellectual property law at St. Mary’s University School of Law, points out,  
a review of actual jury instructions suggests that no court has ever included 
language that singled out specific musical elements [such as melody, rhythm, and 
harmony.] […] One reason for their absence might be a doctrinal split about 
whether a jury should be looking at infringing expressions analytically or 
holistically. Another more practical argument is that some jurors would not 
understand what was meant by the terms melody, rhythm, and harmony. If they 
were not within a juror’s everyday experience, it would be difficult to effectively 
instruct the jury as to their meaning without the investment of substantial time and 
resources.
42
 
Furthermore, empirical research into musical perception, even that executed with 
respect to the experiences of jurors in musical infringement cases where a determination 
of substantial similarity was entailed, illustrates the difficulties associated with discerning 
the degree of similarity under the particular performative circumstances. According to the 
experimental research of Jamie Lund, the “manner of performance of musical 
compositions significantly affects listener perception of similarity between them.”43 For 
her research, Lund prepared electronic transcriptions with Sibelius notation software of 
pieces that had been featured in previous musical infringement litigation. One set of 
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participants heard versions rather faithfully transcribed, and another set heard the same 
works, but with considerable differences in tempo, orchestration, key, and style. The 
participants perceived a significantly lower degree of similarity between compositions 
performed with such alterations than they did in more “similar” transcriptions.44 This 
research indicates that opposing matters of performance—here meaning various 
circumstances of tempo, orchestration, key, and style between two or more versions of a 
work—demonstrably affect the degree to which an audience could perceive substantial 
similarity. Accordingly, transplanting such observations into Grand Upright and noticing 
how O’Sullivan’s underlying harmonic progression is obscured and/or contextually 
distanced from immediate perceptibility by Biz Markie’s lyrics, a jury may have 
difficulty determining substantial similarity.
45
 This would still be unlikely given that 
transcriptions could be made of the original and the offending works and their substantial 
similarity would be immediately visually ascertained, thus perhaps facilitating the aural 
perception of the similarity. In other words, the imposition of a new voice and set of 
lyrics to previously composed material might render the determination of substantial 
similarity more difficult to accomplish than it was in a matter such as Hein et al. v. 
Harris., particularly since, in Biz’s case, the lyrics are rapped instead of sung. Therefore, 
to the extent that substantial similarity was tacitly or implicitly considered by the Grand 
Upright court, it should not have been the sole factor. The “experimentalist” impulse 
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requires the innovative consideration of multiple factors involving such a problem in 
circumstances, such as in digital sampling and musical infringement, where various 
standards are or were utilized, often not even uniformly within the same judicial 
jurisdiction—thus demonstrating the relative lack of stability in the employment of such 
methods and the need to proffer alternative or additional strategies.     
I now address the applicability of the de minimis doctrine to Grand Upright. As 
with substantial similarity, this test was not expressly applied or appealed to by the 
Grand Upright court, since the very fact that any material from the original recording by 
O’Sullivan was used by Biz Markie without prior consent, and irrespective of any artistic 
purposes for which Biz sought to use the material, was constitutive of infringement.
46
 
However, implied within the hasty constraint against unlicensed sampling of any quantity 
is the development of a rather odd form of de minimis consideration.
47
  
Essentially, under the Grand Upright decision, de minimis could no longer be 
asserted to protect sampling from sound recordings even if not for notated musical 
compositions as written. Of course, in Grand Upright, the material at issue was the 
sample from O’Sullivan’s original recording, particularly, and understandably, in light of 
the unapproved manner of its use. Even here, however, one is not precluded from 
theoretically applying a de minimis consideration with respect to a sound recording 
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insofar as a recording is the very bearer of the musical composition.
48
 It is a receptacle of 
the manifestations, through technologically advanced means, of the original notated 
composition. Therefore, it is logical and plausible for one to apply a test of de minimis 
towards excerpts of recordings sampled from previously existing recordings similar to 
those applied in earlier cases involving compositions themselves, since these excerpts 
contain the performed realization of the composition as written. The musicologist Albin 
Zak summarizes the simultaneously ontologically distinct yet in(ter)dependent nature of 
sound recordings and the compositions they contain.  
It [is] useful to think of a recording as containing three distinct compositional 
layers: the song, the musical arrangement, and the track. The song is what can be 
represented on a lead sheet; it usually includes words, melody, chord changes, and 
some degree of formal design. The arrangement is a particular musical setting of 
the song. […] The track is the recording itself. As the layer that represents the 
finished musical work, it subsumes the other two. […] While the song and the 
arrangement are integral aspects of the finished work, both retain and ontological 
independence. They have modes of representation—lead sheets, scores, 
performances—other than the recording.49    
Indeed, the ontological distinction between musical compositions and the sound 
recordings that contain them, as well as the distinctions in the respective copyrights, were 
expressly postulated in Bridgeport, decided thirteen years after Grand Upright with that 
court’s comparatively unusually and surprisingly cursory consideration of these two 
entities. However, one can excuse the Grand Upright court for such coverage insofar as it 
was the first notable case involving the phenomenon of digital sampling, and the process 
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of elucidating the implications for sound recordings within copyright jurisprudence was 
also still a recently opened line of inquiry. First such case or not, it does not appear that 
the development of digital recording and sampling technologies would have necessarily 
required the preclusion of de minimis considerations just because a new digital method of 
recording and format of storage are involved. The novelty of the sampling and recording 
processes, in other words, do not warrant either the complete exclusion of underlying 
compositions as written and recorded from de minimis considerations or the suspension 
of their inclusion in cases where a copyright also exists and extends to the recording that 
contains it. Nothing in the Copyright Act of 1976, which expressly identifies sound 
recordings as “works,” mandates that a de minimis test could only be performed upon the 
recording itself and not on the underlying composition, or vice versa. In fact, the Sixth 
Circuit, as far back as 1925, has maintained the necessity of including, within 
considerations of potential triggering of copyright legislation, various artistic media 
developed subsequent to the initial adoption of the relevant statue(s). That Court held, in 
Jerome H. Remick and Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., that 
the question presented [in that case] is whether, under the circumstances stated, 
the broadcasting of a copyrighted musical composition is an infringement of the 
statutory copyright. […] While the fact that the radio was not developed at the 
time of the Copyright Act [of 1909] was enacted may raise some question as to 
whether it properly comes within the purview of the statute, it is not by that fact 
alone excluded from the statute. […] While statutes should not be stretched to 
apply to new situations not fairly within their scope, they should not be so 
narrowly construed as to permit their evasion because of changing habits due to 
new inventions and discoveries.
50
 
In fact, courts after Grand Upright have applied de minimis tests to the musical 
compositions as composed and contained on a recording rather than just to the collective 
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aggregate known as “the recording” with inseparable characteristics of length, content, 
and manner of creation. Approximately two years prior to being considered by the Sixth 
Circuit, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, involving N.W.A.’s sampling of 
George Clinton’s “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” within the former’s “100 Miles,” was 
heard by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (MDTN). 
Before being ultimately reversed by the Sixth Circuit, which essentially overruled the 
practice of applying de minimis tests to samples of sound recordings without a clear 
explanation, and thereby logically and hypothetically “requir[ing] a finding of 
infringement where a sampler incorporates a one-half section, single note sample from a 
copyright holder’s sound recording into the sampler’s new work,”51 MDTN actually did 
subject recordings and their underlying materials as composed and recorded to a de 
minimis test. The MDTN explained its prior reasoning for finding that the sampled 
materials was de minimis as follows, beginning with an acknowledgement of the inherent 
conceptual and practical challenges of such a case and the requisite caution with which 
the Court must handle it. 
[A] Court’s role in making a de minimis analysis is a tricky one. […] This role 
becomes even more challenging when presented with works from two genres of 
music with which many jurists…are not familiar, and the paucity of case law on 
the issue of whether digital sampling amounts to copyright infringement. Further 
complicating the process is the lack of clear roadmaps for de minimis analysis 
from the circuit courts of the Supreme Court. Still, the case law does provide 
loosely-defined standards and quite a bit of legal commentary has been written on 
digital sampling. […] 
The plaintiffs emphasize the importance of the sampled chord to the overall effect 
of ‘Get Off [Your Ass and Jam,]’ and the Court does not disagree with that 
analysis. However, the Court finds that the copied segment [in this case the one 
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chord] is not even recognizable to a lay observer as being appropriated from the 
plaintiff’s work. […] This fact, combined with the minimal quantitative copying 
and the lack of qualitative similarity between the works, warrants dismissal of 
[the plaintiff’s] claims arising from infringement of its sound recording.52 
This finding, and the approach of subjecting recordings and their underlying 
materials as written and recorded, was overturned by the Sixth Circuit in 2004. While 
acknowledging the “mental, musicological, and technological gymnastics that would 
have to be employed if one were to adapt a de minimis or substantial similarity analysis” 
towards such entities, they rather emphatically explained that 
to begin with, there is ease of enforcement. Get a license or do not sample. […] 
[S]ampling is never accidental. It is not like the case of a composer who has a 
melody in his head, perhaps not even realizing that the reason he hears this 
melody is that it is in the work of another which he had heard before. When you 
sample a sound recording you know you are taking another’s work product.53  
The divergent conclusions reached by these two courts offers but one example of 
the unfortunate reality that “there is no Rosetta stone for the interpretation of [certain] 
copyright statute[s].”54 Given this circumstance, as well as “the paucity of case law” on 
de minimis governing its application in various artistic, particularly musical, contexts, it 
would not be appropriate to subject Biz’s actions in Grand Upright solely to this test 
either. Theoretically, of course, one could do so in terms of both the quantitative and 
qualitative considerations referred to by the MDTN for de minimis tests of digital 
sampling. De minimis just might actually be found in Grand Upright on purely 
quantitative grounds for Biz’s sampling since only the opening four measures of 
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O’Sullivan’s original piece were used,55 but might not be on qualitative grounds given 
that the phrase “Alone Again, Naturally” and its musical accompaniment are looped 
repeatedly throughout Biz’s work and are, of course, indispensably significant facets of 
the overall original composition (see Figure 1.)  
 
Figure1. First four measures of “Alone Again (Naturally)” looped throughout 
Biz’s recording56 
This demonstrates that de minimis, by itself, as with substantial similarity, would 
not be adequate to consider the merits or demerits of Biz’s actions even if it was found to 
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be adequate on both of the aforementioned grounds by the MDTN in that particular 
matter.  
 In the preceding pages, I have addressed the nature of the two tests through which 
courts have traditionally examined the appropriation of pre-existing musical material into 
a new composition and/or recording for the purpose of determining whether infringement 
had occurred. As has been noted, each of these tests, while reasonable and applicable to a 
variety of cases, possess inherent limitations that would render their exclusive 
application, without the concurrent use of others, inappropriate in those cases. 
Furthermore, they are inadequate to the aim of developing a more cogent method that 
would more comprehensively weigh the various facets of sampling engaged in for 
particular cases. One such consideration would be the various artistic purposes for which 
the sampling was performed. The purposes are numerous and frustratingly synonymous 
in the names given to them if not in their actual definition. They include those described 
by Howard Mayer Brown: “borrowing, selfborrowing, transformative imitation, 
quotation, allusion, homage, modeling, emulation, recomposition, influence, paraphrase, 
and indebtedness.”57  
In order to differentiate these practices at least to some extent, a distinction 
between the two that would be most relevant and apposite for considering the artistic 
purposes behind sampling should be presented. A work of “transformative imitation” 
might be perceived by a court as not really an infringement or IEB if the transformative 
nature of the appropriation of the original material renders it sufficiently different or 
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unrecognizable. An instance of digital sampling may also be perceived by a court as an 
“homage”—the second of these two—and perhaps not an instance of infringement or IEB 
if the actual quoted material is part of a larger composition which was itself expressly 
intended to be written as an homage to another composer and for which purpose the 
sampled material was indispensable. It can be readily appreciated that, while it is more 
intellectually demanding, it is also more judicially appropriate, under the experimentalist 
impulse, to factor in the various artistic purposes to determine if infringement and/or IEB 
have occurred. 
With regard to the first of these two categories, the Supreme Court has provided 
some guidance for its identification. In the 1994 case of Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc., the final act of litigation that was initially brought by Acuff-Rose against 2 Live 
Crew for their alleged infringement of the Roy Orbison classic “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the 
Court presented the principle of a “transformative imitation” by posing a new prong of 
the copyright infringement tests, namely, one which  
focuses on whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original 
creation, or whether and to what extent it is ‘transformative,’ altering the original 
with new expression, meaning, or message. The more transformative the new 
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that 
may weigh against a finding of fair use.
58
  
Notwithstanding the usefulness of this principle, it too is not without its practical 
limitations. Particularly in regard to this “transformative imitation” principle, Anjani 
Mandavia has commented that  
the transformative use analysis is, by its very nature, subjective and amorphous, 
often leading courts…to…attempt their own version of art analysis to assess the 
‘character, meaning, expression and message’ of the challenged works. The 
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results of these analyses…generally fail to give clear guidance…on where the 
lines between infringement and fair use should be drawn.
59
  
The confusion as to where the proverbial lines are to be drawn is apparent from 
the contrast between the two Bridgeport decisions, and is especially compounded by the 
distinction forged by the second of these two decisions between infringement of a 
musical composition and that of a sound recording of  that composition. The confusion is 
considerably exacerbated by the fact that no uniformly applicable qualitative or 
quantitative standard exists for the assessment of claims of musical infringement through 
digital sampling, and by the fact that the judicial branch is functionally incapable of 
creating such a uniform standard. Such a line, were it to be drawn, or standard, were it to 
be enacted, could only come about through legislative action. As was made abundantly 
clear as far back as 1834 by Justice McLean in Wheaton and Donaldson v Peters and 
Grigg, copyright provisions are “originated, if at all, under the acts of [C]ongress. […] 
[W]hether they are important or not, is not for the [C]ourt to determine, but [for] the 
[L]egislature. […] [W]e are not at liberty to say that they are unimportant and may be 
dispensed with.”60  
The complications of this facet of determining musical infringement or IEB 
through sampling warrants the concurrent consideration of it as well as the two tests 
previously mentioned. Nevertheless, with respect to Grand Upright, it is important to 
consider whether Biz Markie’s appropriation of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s material could be 
                                                          
59
 Emphasis added, Anjani Mandavia, “Cariou v. Prince—Still No Real Clarity Regarding 
‘Transformative Use’ in Appropriation Art,” Weintraub Tobin: The IP Law Blog, May 5, 2013, 
accessed January 25, 2014, http://www.theiplawblog.com/archives/-copyright-law-cariou-v-
prince-still-no-real-clarity-regarding-transformative-use-in-appropriation-art.html.  
60
 Wheaton v Peters, 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 591, 663-664 (1834). 
  
 
 
 
72 
considered a “transformative imitation” that could be evoked for purely artistic or 
creative purposes. With regard to the perceptual difficulties associated with determining 
whether an instance of digital sampling is properly designated a “transformative 
imitation,” particularly if a court is operating without the expertise of musicologists, the 
observations of the MDTN in the first round of Bridgeport litigation and those of Jamie 
Lund with regard to the difficulties of the “lay listener” test are applicable. Insofar as 
Lund found that alteration in tempo, orchestration, key, and general style complicated the 
ability of a jury to discern similarity between the samples as changed and the original 
material from which they are derived, it is quite reasonable to assert that the imposition of 
an entirely new set of lyrics, rapped instead of sung, over the O’Sullivan sample, may 
similarly complicate the procedure of determining whether “transformative imitation” 
had taken place. One may immediately state that “imitation” has not occurred, but rather 
a direct replication, since the O’Sullivan sample was reproduced from the original 
recording. However, one must recall that such a practice may nonetheless not be deemed 
infringement and/or IEB if the “transformative” qualification is sufficiently present 
within the sampling. And yet, the very phrase “transformative imitation” implicates two 
conditions of the process of appropriating pre-existing material that have been defined 
and considered separately. For instance, Collie and Gorman refer to the potentially 
justiciable digital sampling of DJ Girl Talk and discuss the likelihood of findings of 
infringement in his sampling practices. Referring to the 1841 case of Folsom v Marsh, 
they contend that in that era, the inclusion of pre-existing, original material into a 
subsequently created and derivative work, constituted piracy of the original work. 
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However, since that time, the latitude extended to artists to incorporate what would 
eventually be identified as “sampling” was expanded to permit those instance where 
“something new, with a further purpose or different character, [and which alters] the first 
[work] with new expression [and] meaning” is added.61 
The operative statement in Collie and Gorman’s explanation of the distinction 
between these two practices is that “a court will find [a musician’s] work is 
transformative, or furthers the purpose of the work, because it does not supplant the 
original work,” clearly indicating that, in a case such as Grand Upright where direct 
borrowing did occur, it might be untenable to attribute a “transformative” nature to Biz’s 
sampling. Therefore, infringement and/or IEB may actually be found.
62
 This would 
potentially obviate, or even preclude outright, a court from considering alterations that 
still exist in relation to the original work, such as those considered initially in Bridgeport 
by the MDTN. Based on the foregoing, and on the conflicting impulses between 
identifying a “transformative imitation” in the intuitively understood and expressly 
defined sense of the term and the possible procedural barriers to identifying an instance 
of digital sampling as such, it appears that this test is also not, by itself, sufficiently 
inclusive of various artistic purposes for which sampling could have been performed. 
Therefore, I turn to the second of the two artistic purposes previously referenced—
homage—which may more adequately factor in these ancillary objectives.  
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Biz Markie may have justified his unlicensed appropriation of O’Sullivan’s 
materials on the basis of wanting to create an “homage” to the original work. It would 
seem that, in order for an instance of sampling to be correctly designated as an homage, 
or a reverential allusion to a previous composer and his work, some kind of direct 
statement of this intention should be made by the sampler. However, this requirement 
does not appear to be uniformly agreed upon. For instance, Collie and Gorman state that 
“in classical music [for example] small pieces of another artist’s work are frequently used 
in a piece to pay homage to the influential author,” without specifying what is required of 
the composer utilizing this pre-existing material in order for his practice to be given the 
cover of an homage.
63
  Furthermore, McLeod and DiCola similarly do not identify any 
requirements on the part of the sampler for an instance of sampling to be called an 
“homage,” but do make a distinction between the purpose of sampling, namely “[to] pay 
homage to one’s musical predecessors, or it can mock them,” thus identifying the 
divergent purposes for which sampling could be performed, and thus, also, identifying 
the inherent difference between homage and parody/satire.
64
  
With this distinction in mind, and in the unfortunate absence of any 
documentation in which Biz could have manifested his intentions, the commentary of 
Reuven Ashtar about Grand Upright may permit a more cogent assessment of Biz’s 
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purpose(s).
65
 Lamenting, as several legal scholars before him have done, on the 
impropriety and short-sightedness of the decision in “Grand Upwrong,” Ashtar states that  
the formative condemnation in Grand Upright is particularly incongruous in light 
of the sampler’s motivations. Markie is a notorious ‘digger’ who searches for the 
most esoteric music. His choice of a white pop star’s most famous song was 
indicative of his tendency to jest, and would likely qualify for the subsequently-
affirmed fair use allowance for ‘parodic’ sampling. The laconic decision, framing 
unauthorized sampling as automatic copyright infringement, had an immediate 
chilling effect.
66
 
However, in the absence of an explicit statement of intent by Biz Markie himself 
as to the artistic purposes for which he could have sampled this material, identifying 
potential reasons, and proposing the various artistic designations that may be assigned to 
them, become more difficult. Given the more or less interchangeable and synonymous 
nature of many of the musical borrowing practices identified above by Howard Mayer 
Brown, it appears appropriate to determine whether Biz Markie’s actions could 
reasonably be assessed as either “transformative imitation” or “homage,” and, if so, 
whether or not coverage from the triggering of various copyright provisions could be 
provided by virtue of this whichever designation. The primary reason for focusing upon 
these two practices is that, more than any of the others referred to by Brown, these two 
implicate a fundamental artistic intention or ultimate purpose on the part of the sampler 
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which may or may not be relevant to an inquiry of the permissibility of the particular 
practice under copyright law. Recall the principle that was expounded by the Supreme 
Court in 1994 that “‘transformative’ [works] [alter] the original with new expression, 
meaning, or message,” thus demonstrating a very clear intent on the part of the sampler—
such as the case might be—to so change the original material.67 Recall, also, the 
definition-by-default that was presented by virtue of the distinction forged by McLeod 
and DiCola between homage and parody/satire.
68
 This distinction is further reinforced by 
the subsuming of “parody” within “transformative imitation,” and thus by the 
maintaining of the distinction between “transformative imitation” and “homage,” as 
illustrated in Black’s which defines “parody” as “a transformative use of a well-known 
work for purposes of satirizing, ridiculing, critiquing, or commenting on the original 
work, as opposed to merely alluding to the original to draw attention to the later work.”69 
“Homage,” on the other hand, would not, in a conventional sense, entail such a satirical 
purpose or effect in the sampling process. We can therefore explore whether Biz’s 
sampling could be considered an “homage,” given the difficulties associated with 
determining it to be a “transformative imitation” referenced above. While it is true that 
“each case is different and therefore there is not a pre-determined answer to state what is 
or is not a[n]…homage,”70 I rely on the intuitive understanding of the term “homage” 
presented above, as it is a long recognized principle of the interpretation and/or 
construction of legal texts that “it cannot be pretended that the natural sense of words is 
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to be disregarded, because that which they impart might have been better, or more 
directly expressed [in other terms.]”71 In addition, and for the sake of providing a more 
particularly formulated definition, I rely on the definition of “homage,” in the context of 
digitally appropriating pre-existing materials for new works, provided by Mathias Klang 
and Jan Nolin. 
Klang and Nolin identify what has become obvious during the course of this 
exploration of copyright laws, particular cases in which those laws have been applied, 
and particular creative contexts or mechanisms that have allegedly triggered those laws. 
This is: the difficulty in determining a precise definition of artistic practices such as 
“parody,” “satire,” and others and their judicial consideration in matters of copyright 
infringement. They state that  
the development of technology…[has] created a convention where it frequently 
be[comes] difficult to draw a line between [various] types of references to original 
works [such as] parody, plagiarism, and homage. From the vantage point of the 
creator [of such a derivative work], this makes legal risks unpredictable, and 
therefore may have a chilling effect on the development of culture. […] It 
becomes difficult to draw a line between…clearly illegal practices, and [a] more 
accepted [genre] [such as] homage.
72
 
The concluding sentence of the quotation above is rather curiously phrased; rather 
than make evident a distinction between “clearly illegal practices” and “clearly legal 
practices,” or “arguably legal practices,” or some other description that would at least 
imply, if not express, the possibility of the inherent legality of “homage,” they identify it 
as a “more accepted genre.” While this designation does not unambiguously assert the 
potential legality of the practice, such a condition is alluded to later by Klang and Nolin 
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themselves when they qualify the distinction presented above with the statement that “if a 
work of art signals that it is [an] homage, it…seems to beg exemption from the strictness 
of copyright,” while immediately going on to state that “it also serves to introduce more 
uncertainties into what is already and extremely complex legal area.”73  
Klang and Nolin define “homage” as “a form of reproduction that seems to exist 
as a norm somewhere between plagiarism and copyright. It constitutes a grey area 
between what is otherwise a strict and unforgiving dualism. Homage may be viewed as a 
mark of respect when a creator takes ideas of themes from earlier works and interprets 
them in an original way.”74 While it may appear at first glance that Biz’s actions could be 
defined in this manner, Klang and Nolin subsequently provide two significant 
qualifications of this definition which render the attribution of “homage” to Biz’s actions 
less supportable. They state that an homage is typically “upfront, polite, and reverent” in 
its creative modification of the original material.
75
 However, the deliberately comical 
nature of Biz’s use of O’Sullivan’s material is obvious not only upon hearing it, but also 
in terms of the assessment of it provided by O’Sullivan himself. Recall his comments 
during an interview on this subject. 
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Biz Markie and they [Cold Chillin’ Records] approached us and said, this was in 
1990, that we would like to sample your song and use it on a track. So we said 
okay, and if we like it we'll see where we go from there. They sent it over and 
what they had done was sampled the intro and then he [Biz] rapped over it. 
[…]But then we discovered that he was a comic, a comic rapper, and the one 
thing I am very guarded about is protecting songs and in particular I'll go to my 
grave in defending the song to make sure it is never used in the comic scenario 
which is offensive to those people who bought it for the right reasons. And so 
therefore we refused. But being the kind of people that they were, they decided to 
use it anyway [without permission] so we had to go to court.
76
 
 
 Furthermore, they provide perhaps the clearest intimation that Biz’s actions could 
not properly be assessed as an homage when they concede that while, in ordinary 
circumstances, homage may be considered “Legal/Tolerated…[insofar as] [it is] firmly 
accepted as a legitimate form of activity,” such an impression “is understood from the 
socio-legal reactions to [its] distribution. One could argue that it is the inaction of the 
copyright holder that makes them legitimate.”77 
 Thus, it appears that, according to Klang and Nolin’s formulation of the practice 
of homage, it consists of two characteristics—the first being the inherent tone or nature of 
the modification of the original material, and the second being the action of inaction of 
the holder of the copyright of the appropriated material rendering its use illegitimate or 
legitimate, respectively. As can be discerned from the transcript of the interview, as well 
as from the procedural history of the litigation presented in preceding chapters, it is clear 
that O’Sullivan took legal action in response to Biz’s sampling not only because consent 
for its use was not properly obtained, but also because of the perceived, decidedly not 
“upfront, polite, and reverent” manner in which his original material was used. On the 
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subject of action vs. inaction, the immediate conclusion is that Biz’s actions would not be 
considered the presentation of an homage to Gilbert O’Sullivan. Now, the test turns to 
whether Biz’s modifications of the original material satisfy the characteristics of 
“upfront[ness,] polite[ness,] and reveren[ce]” required of an homage.78 
 In order to determine this, it is useful to compare and contrast Biz’s “Alone 
Again” with a work created through digital sampling that clearly satisfies the conditions 
of an homage—“Gangsta’s Paradise” by the American rapper, Coolio.”Gangsta’s 
Paradise” was composed and recorded by Coolio in 1995 for the film Dangerous Minds 
and achieved immense success and notoriety in the world of popular, selling considerably 
better than the work from which it samples throughout—“Pastime Paradise” by Stevie 
Wonder. Wonder’s composition, in keeping with his well-recognized ability to evoke 
“revolutionary social-protest” as a “musical world citizen [and] humanist,” and to control 
the temptation to capitulate to “mass-market forces”79 that contrived to commodify Black 
music as an easily enjoyable and comprehensible product devoid of more substantial 
significance, Wonder “embraced aesthetic brilliance over commercial acceptance” in 
“Pastime Paradise.”80 Steve Lodder provides an illuminating explanation of the themes of 
this work and the musical manner of their presentation.  
Pitting a backward-referring/retro Afro-Caribbean percussion track against a 
forward-looking synth(etic) string track, the song examines the dichotomy 
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between the pervasive negativity of an imperfect past and the positivity of looking 
forward to an idealized future (not necessarily in this life.) An alternative 
interpretation might be that ‘pastime paradise’ refers to the materialistically 
obsessed ‘leisure-culture’ of modern times, which Stevie could be contrasting 
with the ethic of working hard and getting your reward in heaven.
81
 
   For “Gangsta’s Paradise,” Coolio samples the harmonic and rhythmic 
accompaniment to the original Stevie Wonder work and also entitles his own work in a 
similar fashion as did Biz Markie. Just as Biz Markie entitled his “Alone Again” based 
off the original’s “Alone Again (Naturally),” Coolio entitles his “Gangsta’s Paradise” 
based off the original’s “Pastime Paradise” and also performs this modified version of the 
titular phrase at the correspondingly appropriate places within the music just as Biz does. 
However, given the far more serious and “reverential” nature of Coolio’s sampling, not 
least as a result of the highly emotionally charged and introspective lyrics lamenting the 
self-destructive lifestyle of the “Gangsta” over the original harmonic and rhythmic 
accompaniment, in contrast to the patently absurd and satirical purpose for which Biz had 
rapped over the O’Sullivan sample, it is quite easy to identify the characteristics set forth 
by Klang and Nolin above for an “homage” by sampling.  
These factors can reasonably yield the determination that “Gangsta’s Paradise” is 
an homage to Stevie Wonder’s “Pastime Paradise.”82  However, with respect to Biz’s 
actions, insofar as the circumstances mentioned above by which the creator of the 
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original material may determine that the sampling is not an instance of homage due to his 
perception of a disrespectful or irreverent nature, and/or through his action or inaction 
with regard to that offending sampling, are not actually provided as the appropriate 
methods for this determination within federal copyright law,
83
 and insofar as it is 
debatable whether or not Biz’s sampling renders the original material sufficiently 
“different” to warrant a finding of “fair use” pursuant to Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc.—which would be retroactively applied for the sake of demonstrating that such a 
standard has been developed in copyright jurisprudence—it appears that the test of 
whether Biz’s sampling (or anything else) definitively is an “homage” is also 
conceptually and functionally nebulous. Therefore, this test, by itself, along with the 
others previously addressed, is also inadequate to determine an infringement of the 
original material.
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CONCLUSION—AN EXAMPLE OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TEST FOR 
DETERMINING MUSICAL INFRINGEMENT AS APPLIED TO GRAND 
UPRIGHT 
 
Over the course of the last four chapters, the conceptual and functional limitations of 
three manners of determining musical copyright infringement—de minimis, substantial 
similarity, and artistic purposes—when employed by themself, have been demonstrated. 
To summarize: first, and with specific relevance to Grand Upright, we have observed 
how de minimis by itself is inadequate insofar as courts, such as MDTN, have construed 
this test to entail both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the sampling process in a 
particular case. Furthermore, while Biz Markie’s sampling may not have been 
sufficiently quantitatively great to warrant a sanction under this test, it may be found to 
be qualitatively significant. Second, with respect to substantial similarity, the sampling in 
this case may, by virtue of its use of the very material in O’Sullivan’s original 
composition, appears substantially similar were it not for the imposition of a new voice 
and set of lyrics which may complicate the apprehension of this similarity. Finally, with 
respect to various artistic purposes for which the sampling could have been performed, 
the implications that the response of the creator of the original material, in this case 
O’Sullivan, would have for the ability to determine if the sampling counted as an 
“homage” or “transformative imitation” for “fair use” are tentative propositions not 
codified into the existing legislation or judicial enactments on copyright.  
 The limitations of each of these tests do not necessarily warrant their dismissal 
from the determinations of musical copyright infringement. De minimis is highly valued 
for its ease of practical application in contrast to the “ambiguity of fair use…and the 
  
 
 
 
84 
number of factors involved.”186 Substantial similarity, in certain cases, is also a valued 
method for determining infringement, since, as Judge Frank acknowledged in Arnstein v. 
Porter, “in some cases, the similarities between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s work are 
so extreme and striking as, without more, both to justify an inference of copying and to 
prove” that substantial similarity exists.187  Artistic purposes, when exercised to 
transform the original material sufficiently so as to “introduce new ideas or concepts to 
the public” can also be considered, and have been carefully examined and applied to 
certain cases, especially after the holding of the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose.
188
  
 However, given the unique circumstances of Grand Upright and the other 
practical limitations previously mentioned, they are not, by themselves, dispositive 
mechanisms for resolving the question. It is rather telling that the Grand Upright court 
did not apply any of these tests in determining the outcome of that case, which may be 
attributable to the startling novelty of the sampling process and the theretofore 
insufficiently clarified distinction between copyrights that are placed upon musical 
compositions themselves and those upon the recordings that contain them.  
 To this end, it would be valuable to consider an attempt at determining the nature 
of Biz’s actions by concurrently applying all three of these tests. In so doing, one can 
extract and apply the most salient and unproblematic facets of each and apply them 
together to the facts of this case; a judge considering in this fashion could be said to be 
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“function[ing] less as a referee and more as a part of the problem-solving process.”189 
This entails modifying the overall test to include concurrent considerations of each of 
these three facets in light of the complications that music presents, particularly when the 
distinction between compositions and recordings are addressed. As observed by Tim Wu 
in the context of “intellectual property experimentalism,”  
every law…every enactment, regulation or judicial opinion must be seen as that 
moment’s best guess as to what a rule should be, in light of imperfect information 
and human fallibility. […] Given the imperfect nature of law-making, policy 
should be subject to revision when faced with new information or changed 
conditions.
190
 
What would these most salient facets be? In terms of the long-recognized 
definition of de minimis, this principle could be violated if the sheer quantitative amount 
of material used cross the threshold that, while not existing uniformly for every artistic 
creation, or even for those of one particular medium, can reasonably be determined for 
each unique situation whether by courts, legislators, or industry experts themselves.
191
 
Given the holding of the Sixth Circuit in the second round of Bridgeport that de 
minimis would not be applicable to the recording of an underlying musical composition, 
the inclusion of the latter entity can be maintained with respect to Grand Upright, insofar 
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as the composition itself is more easily susceptible to a de minimis examination; the 
composition can exist without the recording, but the recording cannot exist without the 
composition it contains.
192
 
With regard to substantial similarity, this mechanism can be complicated by the 
use of a new voice and set of lyrics, as previously discussed. What from this test can be 
retained, however, if a hypothetical notated manifestation of the material which Biz 
used—i.e., the music as written, even if not as recorded—which proves to be identical to 
that in the original O’Sullivan composition, as well as the pivotal line, “Alone Again, 
Naturally,” used in both of these works. While Grand Upright may not appear to be as 
easily resolvable a matter as, for instance, Hein et al. v. Harris, since the former involves 
compositions of a larger aggregate number of measures than the latter and fewer 
measures of the derivative work in the former are substantially similar to the 
corresponding measures of the original work than in the latter, comparing the written 
manifestations, if nothing else, of each would very easily yield a determination of 
substantial similarity. 
Finally, with respect to various artistic purposes for which Biz could have 
engaged in this sampling, it would have been much more helpful, and much more 
pertinent guidance would have been afforded, it some explicit expression of Biz’s 
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intentions was available. As I have previously explained, however, such a document 
ostensibly no longer exists, and, for the various logistical and practical reasons identified 
above, it would not be prudent to rely exclusively upon ultimately un-confirmable 
inferences as to whether or not Biz deliberately created an “homage” to O’Sullivan and 
his work. Accordingly, this “prong” must be considered with the other two.  
Applying all three of these mutually complimentary considerations together, the 
following conclusions can be reached: 
 First, with respect to de minimis, a rather curious combination of circumstances 
must be considered. While Biz only uses the first four measures, and thus only four 
measures from O’Sullivan’s entire composition, they are repeated throughout Biz’s 
work. This state of affairs is quite similar to that which obtained in Newton v. Diamond, 
where the Beastie Boys sampled a quantitatively minimal portion of a pre-existing work, 
but repeated it over forty times. In that case, Judge Manella indicated that the brief, three-
note motif from Newton’s original composition is not sufficiently long or original to 
warrant copyright protection, and that, furthermore, the original as written was 
substantially different from its recorded version. However, in Grand Upright, a sample 
that is significantly longer than a mere three-note, otherwise unoriginal and not unusual 
motif, was used. A motif of four measures, consisting of the opening harmonic 
progression unique to this composition and which, furthermore, underscores the title line, 
“Alone Again, Naturally,” is at issue. Accordingly, and also in consideration of the 
number of times that this progression is repeated throughout, one can find that Biz’s 
actions constituted infringement on de minimis grounds.  
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As for substantial similarity, it would be helpful to repeat my previous comment 
on the deceptive simplicity that such a test might entail with respect to Grand Upright:  
The circumstances of Grand Upright are such that it would be reasonable for one 
to assume that, were that action to have been presented to a jury, they would 
immediately conclude that Biz Markie’s work was sufficiently similar to the 
original by O’Sullivan to warrant a judgment of copyright infringement. This is 
because upon hearing and comparing both O’Sullivan’s original and Biz Markie’s 
subsequent composition, the presence of the pivotal material of the former within 
the latter, particularly with the frequency of its use and the indispensable 
contextual significance it affords, would be so obvious that it might be difficult to 
argue otherwise. Determining copyright infringement by virtue of substantial 
similarity between musical compositions has sometimes been accomplished with 
remarkable facility. […] [However,] empirical research into musical perception, 
even that executed with respect to the experiences of jurors in musical 
infringement cases where a determination of substantial similarity was entailed, 
illustrates the difficulties associated with discerning the degree of similarity under 
particular performative circumstances.
193
  
Since it is by itself an inadequate method, it can be considered along with de 
minimis. This can be accomplished by considering the quantitative and qualitative aspects 
of the material sampled-in-fact, even if this material has been rendered aurally dissimilar, 
at least on first impression, through the imposition of a new voice and set of lyrics or 
whatever other modifications in conditions that Lund maintains would compromise the 
perception of similarities. The extrapolation of the original, sampled material from 
whatever superficial changes may have been made to it, coupled with the recognition of 
the length of the material and its significance to the composition overall, as proposed by 
the MDTN, would result in a finding of infringement on substantial similarity grounds.  
Finally, as far as various artistic purposes, in the absence of any explicit 
expression by Biz of his intentions, they could be reasonably inferred precisely by virtue 
of the previous two tests, and not necessarily by virtue of any action or inaction taken in 
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response by O’Sullivan, as Klang and Nolin would have it. Relying upon that action or 
inaction to determine that the sampling was not an “homage,” and hence not a 
“transformative imitation” that would be deemed “fair use,” could hypothetically turn out 
to be erroneous. Biz could have honestly endeavored to create an “homage” and created 
his new work in such a way as to satisfy the conditions of an “homage,” whether as 
generally understood or as conceived specifically by him according to his own unique 
specifications. We might even suppose that there was an authoritatively established and 
widely recognized set of qualities attendant to an “homage” which Biz actually satisfied 
in “Alone Again,” but, nevertheless, O’Sullivan personally felt that this was an 
unacceptable usurpation of his original material. (He clearly stated his beliefs in this 
regard in the interview cited above.) In such a case, if Klang and Nolin were followed, 
subjective impressions of the wrongdoing could override the “true” definitional nature of 
the work. We must not indulge in such constructive fancy, where we call an owl the 
creature which looks, walks, and quacks like a duck. In any event, were Biz to have 
sought the satisfaction of this, or any other, artistic purpose, the appropriate procedures 
should have been followed. Their absence, which is evident in the record of the case, and, 
necessarily by O’Sullivan’s legal action, would warrant Judge Duffy’s initial decision. 
But, insofar as there were conditions that were unfulfilled in the first place, namely the 
appropriate clearance procedures to legally use the sample, their necessity would flow 
from a consideration of the de minimis and substantial similarity principles as applied, 
ideally antecedently, to what Biz was seeking to do.   
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